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There are three essays on the economics of information technology innovation in my dis-
sertation: 
1. Procurement contracting strategies in a hierarchical supply network 
2. R&D offshoring and technology learning in emerging economies – firm level evi-
dence from the information technology industry 
3. Software design strategies in markets with open source competitors 
The first essay addresses the impact of an information technology enabled hierarchi-
cal supply structure on a firm’s procurement strategies.  
The second essay investigates information technology hardware innovation. I exam-
ine R&D offshoring of information technology hardware firms and its impact on R&D 
effort of firms in host countries.  
The third essay focuses on software innovation. I investigate open source software 
and its impact on the design of proprietary software in terms of number of features bun-
dled in the software.  









Information technology (IT) innovation is the key driving force of the development of IT 
industry; successful application of IT innovation has fundamentally transformed the busi-
ness practice of numerous industries and firms. The first essay in the thesis investigates 
the impact of advances in IT on firm procurement contracting strategies. The second es-
say studies the R&D offshoring strategies of multinationals IT firms and the impact of 
multinational R&D offshoring on the innovation incentive of host country firms. In the 
third essay, I explore software design strategy of proprietary software vendors in the 
presence of open source competitors.  
 The second Chapter of the thesis investigates procurement contracting strategy in 
a hierarchical supply network. Much of the existing research assumes a flat distribution 
structure where each supplier of an individual good is an independent entity in a pool of 
suppliers. Recent advances in IT have been instrumental in creating, enabling and sup-
porting a hierarchical distribution structure where entities across distribution levels not 
only exhibit different characteristics (e.g. price, capacity), but also a strong interrelation-
ship. This creates complexity in evaluating contracting decisions for a firm. This essay 
presents an optimization model that formalizes this problem. The two research questions 
are: How does the existence of a hierarchical structure of supplier distribution network 
affect the optimal procurement decisions of a buyer? Under what industry conditions 
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should a buyer undertake a consideration of the full hierarchical procurement structure? 
The computational study shows that considering the hierarchical structure impacts buyer 
procurement contracting strategy. In general, buyers can achieve near optimal results by 
contracting with one level of the suppliers within the hierarchy; i.e., pure strategy is near 
optimal. However, no single pure strategy dominates the other pure strategies. The level 
of suppliers with which buyers should contract is strongly dependent on buyer type and 
the major uncertainty buyer faces. The solutions also show that the loss of not consider-
ing the hierarchy and selecting the wrong level of suppliers could be substantial. This 
study contributes to the literature of procurement strategy in a complex supplier network. 
The findings strongly indicate the importance of taking into consideration the existence 
of hierarchical distribution structure at the supplier side. This should raise the attention of 
academic researchers in their study of economic environment that exhibits the hierarchi-
cal structure. Additionally, the results also have strong practical implications: We provide 
buyers with guidance to manage their contracting and procurement costs taking into con-
sideration the existence of hierarchical supply chain distribution structures. 
 The third Chapter studies R&D offshoring of multinational IT firms and techno-
logical learning in host emerging economies. Multinational R&D offshoring to emerging 
economies has become a prominent phenomenon in recent years. Understanding the re-
sponse of host country competitors is not only critical if multinational enterprises (MNEs) 
are to choose the right R&D offshoring strategies but also important if policy makers in 
MNEs’ home countries are to successfully regulate the MNE R&D offshoring to emerg-
ing economies. The research question in this essay is: How does R&D offshoring of 
MNEs affect the R&D investments of host country firms? A two-stage non-cooperative 
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game is developed to analyze the strategic interaction between multinational and host 
country enterprises engaged in R&D investment. An empirical analysis of 12,309 manu-
facturing firms in the IT industry in China provides evidence that R&D intensity of host 
country firms in the IT industry in China is generally positively affected by the R&D in-
tensity of MNEs. However, the magnitude of the impact depends on how easily host 
country firms are to learn from MNEs. The R&D intensity of a host country firm with 
relatively low technological and management capability is primarily influenced by the 
R&D intensity of only those MNEs whose capabilities are lower than those of the host 
country firms and less influenced by the R&D intensity of more advanced MNEs.  For 
host country firms with relatively high technological and management skills, their R&D 
decisions are mainly affected by only those MNEs whose capabilities are higher than 
those of the host country firms and less affected by MNEs with lower technological and 
management capabilities. The policy implications to host countries of MNE R&D off-
shoring is that governments of emerging economies should be cautious about the R&D 
offshoring of MNEs since its positive impact on the R&D investment decisions of a do-
mestic firm would be only conditional.  
 The fourth Chapter studies software design strategy of a proprietary software 
vendor (PRV) in markets with open source competitors. There is a growing body of lit-
erature investigating the strategic interaction between PRVs and their open source coun-
terparts. Most prior studies focus on software market where the revenue of PRVs comes 
mostly from software license. Nevertheless, open source software is prominent in soft-
ware market where the product exhibits evident post-sale service externality (that is, de-
mand for service contracts increases with larger software transactions); consequently, 
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both software license and post-sale service contract (for the purpose of maintenance, 
technical support, upgrade, etc) constitute some considerable portion of some PRVs’ 
revenue. This Chapter aims to underline the difference between software characterized by 
high demand for service and software characterized by low demand for service in study-
ing how open source software affects the design strategy of PRV. The analysis of an eco-
nomic model implies a magnetic phenomenon in the design of proprietary software (PRS) 
with high demand for service that is not observed in the design of software with low de-
mand for service. That is, when the number of features in competing OSS is below a 
threshold value, the optimal number of features in PRS with high demand for service is 
higher than the number of features in the competing OSS; the higher the number of fea-
tures in the OSS, the lower the number of features in the PRS. This situation resembles 
one in which the position of PRV is attracted to that of the OSS. If the position of OSS 
exceeds the threshold, the design of PRS is placed at the maximal distance away from the 
position of OSS as if the two repel one another. An important implication is that in soft-
ware markets characterized by high demand for service, when OSS is not very sophisti-
cated PRV could introduce more basic version of their software in response to the growth 
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Much of the existing research on procurement strategy assumes a flat distribution 
structure in which each supplier is an independent entity in a pool of suppliers. However, 
in practice, distribution networks often exhibit a hierarchical structure. The travel lodging 
industry, for example, has hotel franchise groups at the top of the hierarchy, hotel brands 
in the middle, and hotel properties at the bottom. There are multiple hotel properties 
under each brand and multiple brands often participate in the same franchise group based 
on multi-year contracts. As a buyer, a firm can participate in procurement contracts with 
and purchase from any or all of the three levels: the franchisor, the brand or the 
individual hotel property. Similar structures can be found in the insurance market and 
intermediate goods markets where distribution is through multiple levels of agencies. 
 The fundamental difference between a flat structure and a hierarchy structure is 
that not only are entities at different distribution levels in the hierarchy structure 
heterogeneous, but they also exhibit significant interconnection. In the travel lodging 
industry example, entities at different distribution levels in the hierarchy structure are 
heterogeneous in terms of their location demand coverage, in their requirements for 
discount availability and in contracting cost. These differences, however, are interrelated 
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for suppliers across the levels in the hierarchy. For example, suppliers at higher levels in 
the hierarchy provide better location demand coverage than those at lower levels and, in 
return, they ask for larger order volume to make discounts available. Figure 2.1 illustrates 








The challenges that a hierarchical distribution structure bring to researchers are 
two-fold. First, the interrelationship embedded in the hierarchy creates complexities in 
procurement decisions for buyers. Second, in situations when a hierarchy structure exists 
but is considered as flat, the information inherently embedded in the hierarchy is lost and 
may lead to suboptimal outcomes. While researchers have extensive experience with 
traditional flat distribution structures, the procurement problem in a hierarchy supplier 
network remains unexplored. 
Studying the procurement problem within a hierarchical supply network has 
strong practical implication as well. Recent advances in Information Technology (IT) 
have been instrumental in creating, enabling and supporting these complex modern 
distribution and procurement structures. From the perspective of a buyer, IT reduces the 
cost of searching for suppliers at lower level in a hierarchy that has not been considered 
Figure 2.1: Lodging Industry Structure 
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in procurement previously, and hence provides buyers with a more complicated supply 
network with more levels of suppliers from which to choose. From the perspective of a 
seller, IT eases the management of complicated organizational structure hence is an 
enabler of the hierarchy. Yet, not only does IT support these structures, but it has also 
enabled the potentially deleterious ability for buyers to undertake these complex 
procurement processes. Using the travel lodging industry example again, according to 
Business Travel News (Davis, 2002), the average annual lodging expenditure by the 100 
largest spenders in the U.S. on business travel (CT100) is large both in monetary value 
(an average of $46 million in 2001) and in average annual number of hotel rooms 
(352,000 in 2001). Domestically, average hotel spending by the CT100 (Cohen, 2004) is 
also large ($32 million in 2001; $30 million in 2002; $27 million in 2003). After 2003, 
the travel demand of the CT100 started rising (Cohen, 2004; Meyer, 2005) and keep 
rising through 2005 and 2006 (Meyer, 2006). Overall, travel represents one of the largest 
controllable costs for a firm. As such, the temptation to optimize procurement is quite 
real as IT has enabled compelx relationships, particularly with respect to service 
operations (Roth and Menor, 2003).  
Despite significant research on supply chain optimization methods and techniques 
using a flat distribution structure, the literature provides little guidance on either the 
optimization of hierarchical distribution structures or, more importantly, the conditions 
under which such complex optimization may be worthwhile. Specifically, we explore the 
importance (quantified as the potential monetary loss to a buyer) of not considering the 
hierarchical structure when it does exist in the procurement environment. Our research 
questions are:   
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How does the existence of a hierarchical structure of supplier distribution network affect 
the optimal procurement decisions of a buyer? 
Under what industry conditions should a buyer undertake a consideration of the full 
hierarchical procurement structure? 
    To study those problems, we consider the following procurement scenario. 
Suppose a firm (buyer) in time period t  needs to purchase services (with no inventory 
necessary) through a period of time fT . These purchases are based on substantial 
information gathering efforts at time gT  and subsequent analysis at time mT . At the 
beginning of the purchasing horizon ( 0T ), the buyer establishes contracts with suppliers. 
Then the buyer purchases service whenever needed through fT  according to the terms in 
the established contract. The buyer needs to decide at 0T  with which levels in the 
hierarchy to contract, and among a pool of suppliers at that level, with whom to contract. 
Figure 2.2 illustrates the timeline of procurement decision making. Our focus is the 
impact of the hierarchical structure on buyer procurement contracting decision and the 





      
Figure 2.2: Timeline of Procurement Decision Making 
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 We examine buyer procurement contracting decisions in the context of the travel 
lodging industry. Common corporate practice to reduce lodging cost is to either engage a 
travel management company and have them negotiate with hoteliers, or negotiate with 
hoteliers (at one or more levels) directly. The resultant procurement constracts specify 
corporate purchasing rates. The rates are determined by some discount scheme in 
negotiation. Examples are quantity discount schemes (e.g., 5% off regular price if the 
number of rooms purchased exceeds 500); market share discount (e.g., 10% if 60% of 
lodging demand is provided by one supplier); dollar sale discount (e.g., 5% if dollar sales 
exceeds $5000). For our analysis, we consider a quantity discount scheme because it is 
commonly adopted by practitioners (e.g. Serlen, 2002, 2004).  
We first model a general hierarchical procurement structure and then link the 
formulation to prior models. Next, we examine 2,040 instances of the model under a 
range of parameters to evaluate the industry conditions under which consideration of the 
full model is justified. Finally, we distill the input conditions into heuristics which guide 
the usage of such models and discuss further issues requiring investigation. With this 
research, we contribute to both the nascent understanding of hierarchical procurement 
and the growing literature on service operations supply chain relationships. Addressing 
significant gaps noted in Kouvelis et al. (2006, pp. 464-465), the heuristics we offer from 
the complex models are (a) accessible to supply chain management professionals thereby 
providing guidance for knowing when to turn to research models; (b) inherently multi-
party rather than focused on analytically tractable single party models; (c) service 
industry focused; and (d) oriented towards future relationships to show ``how the 
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economic, technological, social, and political forces will serve to shape business and 
[supply chain] practices''. 
Section 2.2 describes literature related to this problem. In Section 2.3, we 
formulate a model to represent this problem and describe the relationship of the model 
representation to prior models. Section 2.4 outlines our framework for evaluation and 
presents computational results and sensitivity analysis. Finally, Section 2.5 summarizes 
our results, their implications, and outlines future research needed. 
 
2.2 Related Work 
 
Procurement strategy has been studied extensively in the literature of auction and supply 
contracting. Elmaghraby (2000) groups relevant literature into a matrix according to the 
number of rounds the buyer can select a supplier (single or multiple supplier selection 
periods) and the number of suppliers the buyer procures goods from (sole sourcing or 
multiple sourcing). Within this framework, procurement strategies are investigated from 
different angles under various circumstances. Winner selection mechanism (e.g. Deng 
and Elmaghraby, 2005; Tempelmeier, 2002; Kumar et al., 2006; Chen et al., 2005), sole 
sourcing versus multi-sourcing (e.g. Riordan and Sappington, 1987; Seshadri et al., 1991), 
and optimal menu of procurement contracts (e.g. Corbett and de Groote, 2000; Cachon 
and Zhang, 2006; Wu and Kleindorfer, 2005) have been studied under circumstances 
such as complete or incomplete information, information asymmetry, single contacts 
between buyers and sellers or multiple chance of sourcing, etc. 
In general, our model falls into the category of supplier selection in a supply chain 
with multiple sourcing in single selection period. Several approaches have been applied 
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to study this supplier selection problem. Degraeve et al. (2000) classify those models into 
two groups (single item and multiple items) using the number of items considered in the 
models. Within each group, they further categorize the models using research method 
applied in the study: rating, total cost approaches and mathematical programming. Our 
model fits into the category of one item mathematical programming. Among studies in 
this category, two studies are most pertinent to our research. Chaudhry et al. (1993) 
investigate supplier selection with price breaks. They summarize the types of price breaks 
in practice and discuss the complexity of the problem raised by price breaks. There are 
noncumulative price breaks and cumulative price breaks. The former refers to the case 
when an incremental price break applies only to those units purchased in excess of the 
quantity where a price break occurs. The latter occurs when price break applies to all 
units once the break satisfies quantity requirement. We adopt the policy of cumulative 
price breaks as it is commonly observed in practice (Chaudhry et al., 1993). Weber and 
Current (1993) present a multi-objective approach for the supplier selection problem with 
the constraints of supplier capacity and minimum order of selected suppliers. Although 
this research is in the same literature category as ours, it does not study the hierarchy 
structure in a complex supply network. Furthermore, their study does not incorporates 
neither the location dimension of demand nor transactional cost of contracting as we do 
in our model. 
Other research methods are also used in the analysis of supplier selection in 
supply chains. For example, Snir and Hitt (2004) apply a game-theoretical approach and 
propose a two-stage contract that can help buyers select high-quality vendors in settings 
where vendor quality is uncertain. Tam and Hui (2001) empirically test the impacts 
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vendor characteristics (product variety, brand name, average price, and network 
externalities) have in the selection of computer vendors. Overall most of the prior related 
studies (both analytical and mathematical) assume independent suppliers (Kouvelis et al., 
2006) and do not examine the complex supplier network. 
However, one stream of research that does consider the complex supplier network 
is collaborative planning, which refers to ``supply planning and demand fulfillment 
decision-making among all the suppliers belonging to a company's supply network'' 
(Poundarikapuram and Veeramani, 2004, p. 111). A good example of collaborative 
planning is the global supply chain of personal computer vendors where each tier of the 
supply chain represents components suppliers. Most of the studies within this line of 
research concentrate on developing centralized decision-making models (e.g. Arntzen et 
al., 1995; Cohen and Lee, 1988). Poundarikapuram and Veeramani (2004) are among the 
first to study a distribution network with multiple tiers of suppliers using a distributed 
decision-making algorithm. Although collaborative planning resembles our model, it is 
fundamentally different since collaborative planning decisions are inherently distributed 
in nature due to the multiple stages involved in the process, while our model has a 
centralized aspect as the procurement decision is made in one stage. To be more specific, 
the suppliers in different tiers do not show the hierarchical structure that appears in our 
model; rather they are different in terms of the product (service) they are offering. For 
example, one tier of suppliers consists of raw material suppliers only, a second tier 
consists of component suppliers only, and a third tier consists of product suppliers only. 
The other line of research that considers complex supplier network is multi-
attribute procurement, which means that a vendor is selected by both price and other 
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attributes (Parkes and Kalagnanam, 2005). Transportation costs have been incorporated 
into auctions in a complex supply network (Chen et al., 2005) by modeling the 
procurement decisions of a single buyer that has quantity requirements for a certain 
component at a set of geographically diverse locations. However, while this study focuses 
on auction mechanism design, we study procurement strategy. Also, they model the 
problem from the perspective of a third party auctioneer, while we focus on the problem 
from the perspective of the buyer. Furthermore, they do not consider the hierarchical 
structure of the supply network as we do. 
Degraeve et al. (2004) do include a hierarchical structure in a supply network. In 
their model, there are two layers of suppliers with loose relationship between entities in 
one layer and those in another layer. Our work is different from theirs in that the goal of 
their study is to model a two-layer relationship formally, while our main purpose is to 
discover the significance of a hierarchical supply network in procurement decision 
making. Consequently we apply a different solution approach from their work. We 
propose heuristics of flat policy and benchmark their performance with the optimal 
solution that considers the full hierarchy. 
 
2.3 Model Formulation 
 
Our model assumes a centralized procurement mechanism. We assume a planning 
horizon of one year. At the beginning of the planning horizon, a buyer estimates its 
demand across locations and provides the information to potential suppliers at one or 
more of the three levels (franchise, brand and hotel property level). Suppliers who decide 
to compete for contract submit bids. For our research, a valid bid contains the average 
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unit price, the number of discount intervals, the lower bound and upper bound of each 
discount interval, and the discount offered in each discount interval. Based on the bids, 
the buying firm estimates contracting cost and makes its procurement decision--- the set 
of suppliers to contract with and the procurement allocation among those suppliers. The 
objective is to find an optimal strategy to minimize its expected lodging procurement cost. 
Our model does not consider large meetings, so capacity constraint is not considered. 
We consider sets of franchise hotels F , branded hotels B , and hotel properties 
H . A hotel property/branded hotel belongs to one and only one branded hotel/franchise 
hotel or is independent. The set of locations a buyer is interested in is denoted as A . The 
discount scheme of each entity (a franchise, a brand or a property) is modeled with the 
lower bound ( L ), upper bound (U ) and discount (D ) for each discount interval in the 
scheme. Bounds and discounts are specified in terms of number of rooms the buying firm 
expects to purchase. The following notation is used in the problem formulation: 
  
 A    set of locations for which the buying firm has potential demand  
F    set of franchise hotel groups  
B    set of brand hotels  
H    set of hotel properties  
I    set of all entities with which the buyer can contract, i.e., HBF ∪∪   
i    set index representing entity levels, },,{ HBFi∈   
iI    set of entities in level i , II i ⊆   
aiI ,    set of level i entities that have properties at location Aa∈ , iai II ⊆,   
e    index of individual entity (a franchise, a brand or a hotel property)  
aM    expected total demand at location Aa∈   
eK    set of discount intervals offered by entities e   
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keD ,    discount offered for the 
thk  interval ( eKk ∈  ) by entity e   
keU ,    upper bound on rooms to purchase from entity e  for its 
thk  discount interval ( eKk ∈  )  
keL ,    lower bound on rooms to purchase from entity e  for its 
thk  discount interval ( eKk ∈  )  
ep    average unit price for rooms of entity e   
eN    contracting cost at entity e   
Q    a sufficiently large number  
 











1, if the buyer purchases at discount interval k offered by entities e, IeKk e ∈∀∈ ,  
0, otherwise 
ue,k = integer, rooms to purchase at entity e at discount interval eKk ∈ Ie∈∀  
 
The objective is to minimize the procurement cost for a buyer at three levels 
(Equation 1). The summation across set index Fi = , B  and H  represents the sum of 
expected costs at franchise level, brand level and hotel property level respectively. At 
each level, the expected costs are composed of the lodging costs and the contracting costs. 
Lodging costs are incurred whenever a buyer actually uses a discount keD ,  from entity e  
to purchase some positive number of hotel rooms that belongs to entity e , i.e., 0>,keu . 
The contracting costs are incurred whenever a buyer contracts with an entity e , i.e., 
1=er . 














1=   (1) 
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The minimization is bounded by several constraints. First, Equation 2 enforces the 
demand constraint; i.e., total number of rooms a buyer purchases at location a  should 
satisfy the expected demand at location a . Equation 3 requires that the buyer does not 
contract with a supplier if total number of rooms to purchase from that supplier is zero. It 
also enforces the requirement that a buyer cannot purchase using the discount from a 
supplier if it does not contract with that supplier. Equation 4,  5, and  6 enforce that a 
buyer can purchase rooms at a certain discount only when the number of rooms a buyer 
purchases falls within the range required for that discount and that only one discount 












  Aa ∈∀   (2) 






,,,   (3) 
  IIIeKkLsu iiekekeke ∈∈∈∀≥ ,,,,,,   (4) 
  IIIeKkUsu iiekekeke ∈∈∈∀≤ ,,,,,,   (5) 






,,,    (6) 
Equation 7,  8, and 9 impose integrity and non-negativity conditions on the 
decision variables.  
IIIer iie ∈∈∀∈ ,{0,1}   (7) 
IIIeKks iieke ∈∈∈∀∈ ,,{0,1},  (8) 
IIIeKku iieke ∈∈∈∀≥ ,,0,  (9)  
Our methodology of mathematical programming is well justified. First, it is 
difficult to solve the problem analytically given the complex hierarchical structure. Like 
many complex, service management problems, our problem is not conductive to 
analytical modeling (Roth and Menor, 2003). Second, the various discount schemes and 
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prices offered by hoteliers across multiple locations complicates the problem when the 
number of hoteliers available becomes large. This is determined by the nature of lodging 
industry where both hotel brands and hotel properties have relatively strong power in 
managing room prices and discounts even when they are under the same franchise hotel 
(Boyd and Bilegan, 2003). For example, as a leading global hospitality group, 
InterContinental Hotels Group currently has 11 brands with more than 3,500 hotel 
properties across nearly 100 countries and territories. According to U.S. Census Bureau 
2002, there are 60,870 hotel establishments in U.S. alone. The set of hotels a buying firm 
can contract with becomes even larger when employees travel globally. Individual 
procurement decision making is straight forward; however, the problem size and 
interaction of decision variables create a complex problem. Hence, it is not possible for a 
buyer to find an exactly optimal procurement strategy using a simple heuristic. 
As formulated, this problem is related to the concentrator location problems in 
telecommunications or the facility location problems in logistics. From this perspective, 
the problem hierarchical supply chain procurement is to find the least cost path from the 
corporate customer to the hotel property, recognizing that brand and franchise 
intermediaries exist and can work like network concentrators to aggregate demand 
efficiently. But, benefiting from these intermediaries requires set up costs. Currently, 
several heuristics and efficient algorithms are available for the general problem which 
could potentially applied to our formulation (e.g. Pirkul,1987; Labbe and Yaman, 2006; 
Aardal et al., 1995; Labbe et al., 2005), particularly in a hierarchical arrangement 
(Narasimhan and Pirkul, 1992). 
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However, we do not focus on solution time of heuristics for finding optimal or 
close to optimal solutions. First, the establishment of hotel contracts is an infrequent 
activity, often reviewed only on an annual basis. Second, the calculation of the optimal 
contracting arrangement is done relatively few times during the contract review process. 
 
2.4 Evaluation Framework and Computational Results 
 
2.4.1 A Framework for Contracting Policy Analysis 
 
Recall that our goal is to identify the level in the hierarchy from which a buyer selects 
suppliers to contract with at the beginning of the planning horizon, normally one year. 
Since this problem is not a real time decision problem, speed of solution is not the most 
important concern here. Instead, the key requirement of heuristic is that it must be 
understandable and executable by the user prior to initiating expensive and time 
consuming information gathering and model setup. Keeping this requirement in mind, we 
propose three heuristics of contracting strategy: franchise contracting only, brand 
contracting only, and hotel contracting only. Intuitively, franchise only strategy refers to 
the strategy of only contracting with suppliers at franchise level. Similarly, the strategies 
of brand and hotel contracting only suggest contracting only with suppliers at brand level 
or suppliers at hotel level respectively. For notational convenience, we also use pure 
strategies to denote the three heuristics. The pure strategies are benchmarked against 
using the full hierarchy. Consideration of the full hierarchy will always perform equal or 
better than a pure strategy since it subsumes every pure strategy. The advantage of 
focusing on these heuristics is that, first, they are straightforward and easy to evaluate by 
users. Second, they are consistent with current industry practice of procurement for hotel 
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services (Davis, 2001; Serlen, 2005; Meyer, 2006), hence benchmarking the performance 
of the three pure strategies with the optimal solution that considers the full hierarchy 
provides interesting implications regarding whether or not current industry practice is 
justified. 
We propose a two-dimensional framework for the analysis of contracting polices. 
We capture buyer heterogeneity along one dimension and the uncertainty the buyer faces 
in the other dimension. In terms of buyer heterogeneity, we use the expected demand of 
the buyer as the indicator of buying firm size and expected service price at locations to 
which the buying firm travels as the indicator of location characteristics of corporate 
travel. For example, high expected demand in general implies large buyers that have high 
lodging demand across multiple locations. High expected price implies that the travel 
demand of the buyer is mainly in metropolitan or pricey areas. The three-by-three matrix 
in Table 2.1 demonstrates the nine types of buyers we consider in our analysis which 




Table 2.1: Framework of Buyer Heterogeneity for Contracting Policy Analysis 
     High mean price   Medium mean price   Low mean price  
 High mean demand   Case 1 = ),( hh PD    Case 2 = ),( mh PD    Case 3 = ),( lh PD   
Medium mean demand   Case 4 = ),( hm PD    Case 5 = ),( mm PD    Case 6 = ),( lm PD   




In terms of uncertainty, we consider three key uncertain factors buyer may face at 
the contracting stage: location demand, location service price and contracting cost. We 
focus on uncertainty in our analysis because contract theory has shown that the main 
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reason for buyers to contract is to prepare for the risk of unforeseen circumstances that 
may be encountered later. This implies that uncertainty is a critical factor in buyer 
contracting decision making. Hence, in our study of contracting strategy, we underline 
the importance of uncertainty in decision making. The three key uncertain factors are 
selected based on a simple framework proposed by Tullous and Utecht (1992) in their 
study of decision making regarding multiple or single sourcing. Through literature review 
and interviews with purchasing agents, Tullous and Utecht (1992) develop three 
representative uncertainty purchasing situations: need uncertainty, market uncertainty and 
transaction uncertainty. We map their framework to our problem domain by defining a) 
need uncertainty to be buyer uncertainty about his demand for lodging service through 
the year, b) market uncertainty to be buyer uncertainty about the dynamic price of 
lodging service across locations (Elmaghraby and Keskinocak, 2003), and c) transaction 
uncertainty to be buyer uncertainty about the potential cost of contracting with each 
supplier (Serlen, 2005). Each of the uncertain factors we consider has directly 
implications on practice. For example, at the contracting stage, a buyer always faces the 
uncertain demand and price. Buyers often face highly uncertain contracting cost when 
they contract with a supplier for the first time. Overall, our framework allows us to study 
contracting strategy in a hierarchical supply network under a broad range of scenarios 
that covers a large pool of buyers. 
 
2.4.2 Computational Evaluation 
 
The objective of computational evaluation is to examine the effectiveness of the three 
pure strategies by benchmarking the solution of the pure strategies with the optimal 
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solution generated using the full hierarchy. The model is an integer linear program. Its 
optimal solution and the solution of the heuristics are obtained using ILOG Cplex 
10.0.1.0 (Concert Technology) with Microsoft Visual C++ 2005. Random data is 
generated according to the framework presented in Section 2.4.1. The hierarchical 
relationship was generated using 3 franchises, 10 brands, and 10,000 hotel properties. 
This is generated for illustration purposes. A summary of the hierarchical structure of top 
50 franchises in the U.S. can be found at:  
http://www.ahla.com/products_info_center_top50.asp. The hotel properties were 
randomly distributed to 1,000 locations. The location can be thought as a region, a state, 
or a city. The nine types of buyers were generated following industry practice. Buyers 
with high, medium and low demand are designed as having an expected demand of 300, 
150 and 50 rooms in each location respectively (Davis, 2002; Baker et al., 2007). 
Locations with high, medium and low service prices are designed as having an expected 
room price of 300, 150 and 50 U.S. dollars respectively (Baker et al., 2007; Anonymous, 
2006). This leads to nine types of buyers as discussed in Section 2.4.1. 
Three categories of data sets were generated for each type of buyers. In the first 
category, we vary location demand uncertainty and fix other uncertain variables at their 
mean value. We generated 10 data points for location demand standard deviation. The 
range of data points generated is dependent on the mean. This way, we generated a 
reasonable but wide range of data. In the second and third categories, we vary location 
service price uncertainty and contract cost uncertainty fixing other uncertain variables at 
their mean value respectively. Altogether we generated 27 data sets. The goal of 
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computational evaluation is to compare the performance of the heuristics with the optimal 
solutions in each data set. 
Recall that the difficulty of the problem we study here lies in the fact that 
suppliers in different levels of the hierarchy are interrelated. We incorporate the 
interrelationship in data generation. Specifically, suppliers at franchise level, brand level 
and hotel level have different and related expected contracting cost and requirements on 
the quantity threshold for discount to be available. Our experiences with industry practice 
show that in general the expected contracting cost with suppliers at higher level of the 
hierarchy is higher than those at lower level; the quantity discount threshold of suppliers 
at higher level is in general higher than that at lower levels. Although helpful, this 
information is still vague. To further reduce the subjective estimates of the parameters, 
we investigated the brand and hotel property information of the top 50 hotel companies in 
the directory of Hotel & Lodging Companies managed by the American Hotel & Lodging 
Association. We found that the average number of brands among the 50 hotel companies 
is 7, the average number of hotel properties under each brand is 110 and 193 for domestic 
properties and for all the properties (including both domestic and non-domestic 
properties), respectively. We did not calculate the contracting cost and the purchase 
quantity threshold of higher level in the hierarchy by multiplying the contracting cost at 
lower level with the number of entities in the lower level because contracting cost in 
general exhibits economy of scale to some extent; e.g., contracting cost with a franchise 
of 7 brands is in general less than the sum of contracting cost with each of the brands. 
With this in mind, we estimated the mean contract cost for suppliers at franchise level to 
be 36,000, for suppliers at brand level to be 9000 and for suppliers at hotel level to be 900. 
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The purchase quantity thresholds to validate discount at franchise, brand and hotel levels 
are estimated to be 75, 37 and 10 respectively. To further reduce subjective effects from 
modeling assumptions on our results, we conduct sensitivity analysis in Section 2.4.4 for 




The heuristic performance is determined by the difference between the heuristic solution 
and the optimal solution. The results of data set 1 (based on demand uncertainty) are 






Although not shown, data set 2 (based on price uncertainty) shows a similar 
pattern. Figure 2.3 shows that given the discount structure, the brand only pure strategy is 
the robust optimal strategy among the three heuristics when fixing contracting cost at the 
mean value and varying the mean and standard deviation of location demand (or room 
Figure 2.3: Loss of Heuristics with Demand Uncertainty 
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price) one at a time. In both data sets, the full hierarchy is not necessary; a near optimal 
result can be achieved by contracting at brand level only. In addition, the strategies of 
contracting only at franchise level dominate the hotel only contracting strategy. 
 The rationale for brand only strategy to be optimal is that in general a brand only 
contracting strategy offers the advantage of satisfying demand at a relatively low 
contracting cost when compared with franchise contracting and hotel contracting. 
Contracting at franchise level provides best location demand coverage at the cost of 
potentially high contracting cost; contracting at hotel level provides poor location 
coverage at relatively low contracting cost. Given the discount structure, the result is 
robust across large range of standard deviation of location demand and room price, which 
is also intuitive. Our goal is to compare the three pure strategies with the full hierarchy 
strategy. Because neither demand nor price directly varies across franchise, brand and 
hotel level (demand varies across locations and price varies across hotel properties), they 
will affect the cost savings but not the relative performance of the four strategies. 
Since both mean and standard deviation of contracting cost naturally varies across 
franchise, brand and hotel property, the optimal strategy among the four heuristics will be 
affected by contracting cost distribution. Our results show that this truly is the case. We 
summarize our findings in Table 2.2. 
Overall, when contract cost is uncertain, pure strategy performance can be as 
good as using the full hierarchy, but there are cases when the full hierarchy performs 
slightly better. We only present optimal pure strategies in Table 2.2 because a full 
hierarchy strategy only performs slightly better in small portion of our solutions. Table 
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2.2 shows that none of the three pure strategies dominates other pure strategies. This is 




Table 2.2: Optimal Pure Strategies under Contract Cost Uncertainty 
Price  
Demand  
 Contract  
 Cost  
 σ   
 High  
 300=Pµ   
 Medium  
 150=Pµ   
 Low  
 50=Pµ   
  
High  
300=Dµ   
  
 Low  
 Medium  
 High  
  
 Case 1  
 Brand  
 Hotel  
 Hotel  
  
 Case 2  
 Brand  
 Hotel  
 Hotel  
  
 Case 3 
 Brand  
 Franchise  




150=Dµ   
  
 Low  
 Medium  
 High  
  
 Case 4  
 Brand  
 Franchise  
 Hotel  
  
 Case 5  
 Brand  
 Franchise  
 Hotel  
  
 Case 6  
 Brand  
 Franchise  




50=Dµ   
  
 Low  
 Medium  
 High  
  
 Case 7  
 Brand  
 Hotel  
 Hotel  
  
 Case 8  
 Franchise  
 Hotel  
 Hotel  
 
 Case 9  
 Franchise  
 Hotel  





Taking a closer look at the results, we find that overall the results provide good 
heuristics for corporate customer contracting strategy taking into consideration the 
uncertainty of contract cost. Essentially a corporate customer can benefit from contract 
cost uncertainty to an extent under some conditions. Whether and when a corporate 
customer should exploit contract cost uncertainty is moderated by relative cost between 
contracting and room purchasing. The rationale is that the objective function consists of 
contract cost and room purchasing cost where the former is determined by contract cost 
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standard deviation (when we fix mean contract cost) and the latter by the product of price 
and demand. We use these findings in Table 2.2 to develop the following propositions. 
 Proposition 1 When contract cost standard deviation is low, whether buyer should seek 
risk in exploiting uncertain contract cost is dependent on the relative cost of contract and 
room.   
a. When room cost is relatively high compared with contract cost, a buyer should focus 
more on managing room cost than on managing contract cost. It is not worth 
contracting at the franchise level for some chance of low contract cost. Since 
contracting at hotel property level does not provide good coverage of room 
demand, contracting at brand level naturally becomes the best option (cases 1 
through 7).  
b. When room cost is relatively low (cases 8 and 9), buyers should focus more on 
managing contract cost than on room cost. It is better for a buyer to exploit the 
uncertain contract cost (risk seeking behavior) by contracting at franchise level. 
Note that although risk seeking behavior is better in this case, it does not mean the 
buyer bears much risk as the standard deviation of contract cost is not high. As a 
result, contracting at franchise level is better.  
Proposition 2 When contract cost standard deviation is sufficiently high, the chance for 
buyer to run into a large contract cost is also high. Buyer should not risk contracting at 
franchise or brand level. In this case, regardless of the relative cost between contract and 
room, the optimal strategy for buyer is to contract only at the level that provides the 
lowest mean contract cost, i.e., at hotel property level (cases 1 through 9).   
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 Proposition 3 When contract cost standard deviation is in between the situation 
discussed in propositions 1 and 2, whether the buyer should seek risk in exploiting 
uncertain contract cost is dependent on the relative cost of contract and room.   
a. When room cost is high compared with contracting cost (cases 1 and 2), the buyer 
should focus more on managing room cost than on managing contracting cost. It is 
not worth contracting at the franchise level for some chance of low contract cost. 
This is the same as the situation in proposition 1(a). However, since the contract 
cost standard deviation in this case is higher than in proposition 1(a), the risk of 
incurring high contracting cost by contracting with the brand level is also higher 
in this case, which pushes the optimal strategy from brand contracting in 
proposition 1(a) to contracting with hotel property level.  
b. When room cost is relatively low compared with contract cost (cases 7 through 9), the 
buyer should not exploit the uncertain contract cost as in proposition 1(b) because 
the risk of incurring high contracting cost by contracting with the franchise and 
brand levels is higher in this situation than in proposition 1(b). Moreover, since 
demand is low in these cases, the need for high demand coverage is not large. As a 
result, contracting with hotel properties is the optimal strategy.  
 c.   When room cost is in between a and b (cases 3 through 6), our computational 
evaluation shows that the contracting cost reduction benefit of risk seeking exceeds 
the risk of incurring high contracting cost by contracting at franchise level.  
  Although proposition 1 to 3 can be used to guide buyers in choosing the right 
procurement contracting strategy, for corporate buyers to easily come up with some ideas 
about the level of suppliers with which to contract, we need to develop some rules-of-
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thumb. To do so, we relax the requirement of best heuristic as we did in understanding 
the rationale and only look at the heuristics that produce reasonably good result under all 
the scenarios considered above. For example, in the low mean demand and medium mean 
price case, when contracting cost uncertainty is sufficiently low, contracting at franchise 
level appears to be the optimal heuristic, but contracting at brand level performs quite 
well as well and the difference in their performance is small. Overall, we find that there 
does exist some threshold in contract cost uncertainty, below and above which the 
reasonably good level of suppliers with which to contract changes. Specifically, we find 
that the first threshold of contract cost uncertainty is when the standard deviation of 
contract cost is at the mean contract cost and the second threshold is at one and a third of 
the mean contract cost. For example, suppose the mean contract cost is 900. When the 
contract cost standard deviation is below 900, contracting at either brand or franchise 
level perform well. When it is above 900 but below 1200, contracting at either franchise 
level or hotel level performs well. When it is above 1200, buyer should only contract at 
hotel level. This is the case in three out of the nine types of buyers in our results. Similar 
pattern in terms of the threshold of contract cost uncertainty can be found in other types 
of buyers as well. As is shown in the next section, this pattern also holds in our sensitivity 
analysis. 
To summarize, although the performance of heuristics with respect to contract 
cost uncertainty appears random at the first look, the rationale analysis provides some 
intuition about the selection of supplier levels in contracting and the rules-of-thumb 
provide buyers with information regarding the extent to which their selection still holds. 
 
2.4.4 Sensitivity Analysis 
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The results in Section 2.4.3 are based on fixed expected contract cost and quantity 
threshold requirements. To check whether the findings are robust when adjusting either 
of them, we generated three additional sets of data for the three uncertain factors 
respectively and further analyze the heuristics. We begin with the analysis by adjusting 
discount threshold requirement. Then we adjust the mean contract cost in the analysis. 
Since our intention here is not to derive additional complete sets of solutions, but check 
the sensitivity of our findings, we do not repeat the analysis as we did in Section 2.4.3; 
rather we choose one scenario out of the nine types of buyers in our analysis. Without 
loss of generality, we settle on the scenario of medium mean demand and mean price (the 
most general case). 
 
2.4.4.1 Sensitivity analysis of Discount Thresholds 
 
Since it is the relative discount threshold suppliers at different levels of the hierarchy 
offer matters, we adjusted the discount threshold requirement of suppliers at franchise 
level and hotel level in our analysis and left the discount threshold of suppliers at brand 
level the same as in Section 2.4.3. Specifically, we analyze four cases: increasing the 
threshold requirement of suppliers at franchise level to 150, then 225 and increasing the 
threshold requirement of suppliers at hotel level to 20 then 25. Our analysis shows that 
the findings regarding the heuristic performance with respect to demand and price 
uncertainty are robust when we adjust the discount threshold requirement. This implies 
that if the key uncertainty a buyer faces at the contracting stage is demand or the dynamic 
service prices at locations to which travel is needed, the buyer can follow a similar 
contracting strategy in terms of level of suppliers to contract with when suppliers offer 
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discount thresholds that are different from our analysis in Section 2.4.3. Another practical 
implication of our sensitivity analysis is regarding corporate travel strategy of whether to 
enforce the use of corporate contract in employee daily lodging reservation. It is a 
common practice for corporate buyers of lodging service to provide their employees with 
the flexibility to either reserve using corporate negotiated rates from preferred suppliers 
(purchase through contract) or find good deals on the Internet (purchase in the spot 
market)(e.g. Cohen, 2000; McCartney, 2006). Our sensitivity analysis shows that the 
heuristics perform robustly across the two strategies: enforcing or not enforcing the use 
of corporate contract in reservation for lodging service. The result is shown in Figure 2.4. 
The results for price uncertainty are not included; however, they are similar to the results 
for demand uncertainty. 
Then we examined the heuristic performance with respect to contract cost 
uncertainty when we adjust the discount threshold requirement of suppliers at different 
levels. Our analysis shows that the findings are robust when the discount threshold of 
suppliers at hotel level is sufficiently lower than the threshold offer of suppliers at brand 
level, but sensitive when the discount threshold of suppliers at hotel level moves closer 
toward that of suppliers at brand level. This implies that if the key uncertainty buyer faces 
at the contracting stage is contract cost, he can follow a similar contracting strategy in 
terms of level of suppliers with which to contract when the discount threshold of 
suppliers at hotel level is sufficiently lower than the discount threshold of suppliers at 
brand level. Otherwise, he should be cautious in selecting the level of suppliers in the 
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hierarchy with which to contract when the discount threshold offered by suppliers is 
different from the ones used in Section 2.4.3. We also find that the heuristic performance 
is sensitive to discount threshold of suppliers at franchise level. When we increase the 
discount threshold of suppliers at franchise level, the best heuristic changes and the loss 
difference between using the new and the old optimal heuristic is large, indicating a 
potential large loss from not considering the sensitivity of heuristics performance to 
discount threshold of suppliers at franchise level.  
 
2.4.4.2 Sensitivity Analysis of Mean Contract Cost 
 
Since it is the relative mean contract cost suppliers at different levels of the hierarchy 
incur that matters, we adjusted the mean contract cost of suppliers at franchise level and 
hotel level in our analysis and left the mean contract cost of suppliers at brand level the 
same as in Section 2.4.3. Specifically, we analyze four cases: increasing the mean 
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contract cost to 45,000 and decreasing it to 27,000 for suppliers at franchise level, and 
increasing it to 1,800 and decreasing it to 450 for suppliers at hotel level. We begin with 
the analysis of demand and price uncertainty. Overall the performance of the heuristics is 
robust to adjustment of the mean contract cost of suppliers at different levels in the 
hierarchy. 
 Then we examined the heuristic performance with respect to contract cost 
uncertainty by varying supplier mean contract cost. Our analysis shows that the findings 
are robust when the mean contract cost of suppliers at franchise level moves toward the 
mean contract cost of suppliers at brand level, but sensitive when the mean contract cost 
of suppliers at franchise level is much higher than that of suppliers at brand level. This 
implies that if the key uncertainty buyer faces at the contracting stage is contract cost, he 
can follow a similar contracting strategy in terms of level of suppliers with which to 
contract when the mean contract cost with suppliers at franchise level is sufficiently close 
to the mean contract cost with suppliers at brand level. Otherwise, he should be careful 
applying our findings in Section 2.4.3 directly. We also find that the heuristic 
performance is sensitive to mean contract cost with suppliers at hotel level. When we 
increase and decrease the mean contract cost of suppliers at hotel level, the best heuristic 
changes and the loss difference between using the new and the old optimal heuristic is 
large, implying a potential large loss from not considering the sensitivity of heuristics 
performance to mean contract cost of suppliers at hotel level.  
 
2.5 Conclusion and Future Work 
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This paper presents an optimization model that formalizes a procurement contracting 
problem in hierarchical supply distribution network. The solutions show that considering 
the hierarchical structure impacts buyer procurement contracting strategy. In general, 
buyers can achieve near optimal results by contracting with one level of the suppliers 
within the hierarchy; i.e., pure strategy is near optimal. However, no single pure strategy 
dominates the other pure strategies. The level of suppliers with which buyers should 
contract is strongly dependent on buyer type and the major uncertainty buyer faces. Our 
solutions also show that the loss of not considering the hierarchy and selecting the wrong 
level of suppliers could be substantial. Therefore, we identify some rules-of-thumb for 
selecting the right level of contracting suppliers. Our findings strongly indicate the 
importance of taking into consideration the existence of hierarchical distribution structure 
at the supplier side. This should raise the attention of academic researchers in their study 
of economic environment that exhibits the hierarchical structure. Additionally, our results 
also have strong practical implications: Although simple heuristic rules are easy to be 
implemented, they can yield significantly suboptimal results. Our results give guidance to 
practitioners of the potential savings obtainable before undertaking costly and time 
consuming information gathering processes. 
We use publicly available statistics and randomly generated data to obtain our 
solutions; as such, solutions would likely be somewhat different with real industry data. 
This will be one direction to explore in future work. Additionally, for tractability, the 
current model assumes homogeneous hotel rooms. To formulate the model closer to 
reality, this assumption can be relaxed in future research by allowing for heterogeneous 
hotel rooms where hotel ranks, reputation and other characteristics are considered. 
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Further, our paper focuses on lodging procurement problems in a centralized environment. 
Future work can be done in a decentralized environment where there are multiple 
sourcing divisions that are responsible for mutually exclusive geographic lodging demand. 
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 CHAPTER 3 
 
R&D OFFSHORING AND TECHNOLOGY LEARNING IN 









Geographical boundaries have become increasingly blurred with regard to the R&D ac-
tivities of multinational enterprises (MNEs).2  Rising R&D costs, the increasing risk and 
complexity of technological development, and intense competition in domestic and 
global markets have compelled firms to locate their R&D activities outside the borders of 
their home countries (Stembridge, 2007). The primary destinations of the R&D offshor-
ing of MNEs appear to be emerging economies3.  A survey of over 200 MNEs in the 
United States and Western Europe in 2005 revealed that about 70 percent of the respon-
dents expected an increase in R&D employment in China in the next three years, and 
slightly more than 40 percent anticipated an expansion in India (Thursby and Thursby, 
2006).  
                                                 
1 Zhe Qu acknowledges financial support from the Alan & Mildred Peterson Foundation. 
2 “MNEs” and “foreign firms” are used interchangeably to refer to firms that operate not 
only in their home countries but also in foreign countries. “Domestic firms,” “local 
firms,” and “host country firms” are used interchangeably to refer to firms that operate 
only in countries where MNEs offshore their R&D. 
3 Emerging economies are defined as “low-income, rapid-growth countries using eco-
nomic liberalization as their primary engine of growth” (Hoskisson et al. 2000; Arnold 
and Quelch 1998). China is commonly identified as an emerging economy (Hoskisson et 
al. 2000). 
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 The escalating R&D expansion of MNEs to emerging economies has drawn con-
siderable attention in their home countries. Policy makers in their home countries are 
worried that R&D offshoring could lead to a loss of crucial intellectual property to over-
seas competitors (Hemphill, 2005), which could create an immediate threat to their com-
petitive advantage (Lieberman, 2004; Bardhan and Jaffee, 2005). Moreover, the possible 
shedding of well-paid R&D jobs and the downward pressure on the wages of engineers 
and research scientists in the home countries could bear serious consequences because 
their students would be discouraged from pursuing engineering or science careers, which 
further exacerbates the problem of losing competitive advantage in the long run4.  
 Managers of MNEs are challenged by an emerging “networked innovation sys-
tem” based on their R&D offshoring actions (Engardio, 2006; Bardhan, 2006). The Bos-
ton Consulting Group (2005) argued that decisions such as where to locate a new R&D 
center, what roles to assign it, and how to integrate it into the existing innovation infra-
structure of the MNE would directly impact the outcome of investments and thus demand 
systematic attention.  
 Responding to the concerns and questions about R&D offshoring, researchers 
have investigated factors that motivate or inhibit R&D offshoring (e.g., Thursby and 
Thursby, 2006; Ambos, 2005; Kuemmerle, 1999; Le Bas and Sierra, 2002) and the condi-
tions in which R&D offshoring could benefit MNEs and their home countries (e.g., Gers-
bach and Schmutzler, 2006).  Thursby and Thursby (2006) found that market growth po-
tential and R&D personnel quality are the top two factors that drive MNEs to offshore 
R&D to emerging economies, while the quality of intellectual property protection inhibits 
                                                 
4 Despite the potential disadvantages accompanying R&D offshoring, researchers have found that it might 
improve welfare in home countries (Gersbach and Schmutzler, 2006).  
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MNE R&D offshoring to these economies. In terms of the impact of MNE R&D offshor-
ing on home countries, Gersbach and Schmutzler (2006) found that it usually increases 
their welfare5.   
  This paper investigates the impact of MNE R&D offshoring on the R&D invest-
ment of host country firms in emerging economies. We believe this impact could have a 
long-term effect on both the MNEs and their home countries. This is because MNE R&D 
offshoring disturbs the equilibrium of R&D investment competition between foreign 
firms and domestic firms in host countries and forces the domestic firms to respond.  That 
is, since domestic firms have much to learn from their foreign counterparts, they would 
strengthen their commitment to R&D so that they could compete with the foreign en-
trants at a more advanced level. Furthermore, MNE R&D investment in host countries 
increases the R&D capital stock in these countries, manifested as scientific instruments, 
advanced machinery, and sophisticated facilities. This capital stock could generate a de-
mand for advanced facilities and machinery in the host countries and stimulate the devel-
opment of related high-tech industries. MNE R&D investment could also create research-
oriented jobs, which would motivate host countries to expand their higher education sys-
tem, train more scientists and engineers, and nurture the development of high caliber hu-
man resources. Overall, the effects of MNE R&D offshoring on host countries could af-
fect the competitive edge of both the MNEs and their home countries in the long run. To 
succeed in overseas markets, the MNEs and the policy makers of their home countries 
                                                 
5 There is a large body of endogenous growth literature that investigate the impact of 
R&D on economic growth (e.g., Romer, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Jones, 1995). 
This line of literature is not thoroughly reviewed because the focus in this paper is the 
impact of R&D offshoring.  
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must anticipate the possible reactions of host country firms before they engage in any 
R&D activity. Otherwise, they could be positioned at a disadvantage in the long run.  
 Host country governments, particularly those in emerging economies, have en-
deavored to facilitate technology spillover from foreign direct investment (FDI) (Lieber-
man, 2004) because they believe successful technology spillover can help domestic firms 
build indigenous technological capabilities and eventually move up in the value chain.  
However, evidence has shown that the presence of foreign capital does not guarantee 
technology spillover.  For example, Aitken and Harrison (1999) found that foreign in-
vestment negatively affected the productivity of domestically-owned plants in Venezuela 
because joint ventures gained market share at the expense of domestically-owned firms 
and forced them to produce less at a higher average cost. We argue that it is difficult for a 
domestic firm to achieve technology spillover and improve its indigenous innovation ca-
pabilities without its own adequate R&D investment, even with an influx of foreign capi-
tal.  Therefore, it is important that policy makers and business managers in host countries 
recognize the impact of MNE R&D offshoring on the R&D investment decisions of the 
domestic firms.  
 To explain how MNE R&D offshoring shapes R&D investment decisions of do-
mestic firms, we have developed a two-stage non-cooperative game.  In the first stage of 
the game, innovating MNEs and innovating domestic firms engage in cost reducing R&D.  
In the second stage, all firms participate in Cournot competition in a homogeneous prod-
uct market. The model implies that MNE R&D offshoring could positively affect the 
R&D effort of a domestic firm if it is sufficiently easy for the firm to learn from the MNE.   
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 The empirical analysis of 12,309 manufacturing firms in the electronic and tele-
communications (IT) industry in China shows that MNE R&D offshoring has a positive 
effect on the R&D intensity of domestic firms in the IT industry in China. In particular, 
R&D intensity of domestic firms is mainly influenced by MNEs with higher technologi-
cal and management capabilities, implying relatively strong learning from MNEs with 
higher capabilities. When we separate domestic firms into low- and high-capability 
groups in our analysis, we find that R&D intensity of domestic firms with relatively low 
technological and management capabilities is primarily influenced by MNEs whose ca-
pabilities are lower than theirs and less influenced by MNEs whose capabilities are supe-
rior. By contrast, for domestic firms with relatively high capabilities, their R&D intensity 
is mainly influenced by MNEs whose capabilities are superior to theirs and less influ-
enced by less capable MNEs. We also find that the positive effect of foreign R&D in-
vestment diminishes as the geographic distance between the MNEs and the domestic 
firms increases because it is difficult for domestic firms to learn from MNEs that are lo-
cated far away from them. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides the 
framework used to explain the rationale behind the R&D investment decisions of domes-
tic firms in response to MNE R&D offshoring. Section 3.3 presents empirical evidence, 
Section 3.4 presents findings and related policy implications, and Section 3.5 concludes.  
 
3.2 A Theoretical Framework  
 
3.2.1 Literature Review  
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As reviewed by Crespo and Fontoura (2007), the literature on FDI suggests that positive 
spillover could occur through five channels: demonstration of foreign enterprises, the 
mobility of labor, the positive impact of MNE on the export capacity of domestic firms, 
the competition induced by MNE in the domestic economy and backward and forward 
linkage with domestic firms6.  However, a number of studies presented contrasting find-
ings that FDI could negatively affect the productivity of host country firms. For example, 
using the data of Venezuelan firms, Aitken and Harrison (1999) proposed the market 
stealing hypothesis to account for negative FDI spillovers. They contested that competi-
tion from foreign entrants forces domestic firms to reduce their output, which indirectly 
increases their average production costs. Consequently, the presence of foreign capital 
lowers the productivity of the domestic firms. In their study of Moroccan firms, Haddad 
and Harrison (1993) similarly rejected the hypothesis that the presence of foreign firms 
accelerated the productivity growth of domestic firms. In spite of the rigor of these analy-
ses using plant level data, they received some criticism. Javorcik (2004) argued that stud-
ies by Haddad and Harrison (1993) and Aitken and Harrison (1999) failed to find positive 
FDI spillovers because they focused merely on intra-industry, or horizontal spillovers. 
Javorcik (2004) measured vertical (inter-industry) spillover in a study of Lithuanian 
manufacturing firms and found positive productivity spillovers between foreign affiliates 
and their local suppliers in upstream sectors.  
 Another stream of research, which emphasized the impact of FDI on the R&D 
investment of host country firms, provided a different explanation for the empirical find-
                                                 
6 Technology spillover in FDI literature generally refers to the positive effects of FDI on 
the productivity of host country firms. A detailed review of the FDI literature can also be 
found in Blomstrom and Kokko (1998, 2001), Saggi (2002) and Marin and Bell (2006). 
41 
ing of negative FDI spillover, which we refer to as the “R&D impact” hypothesis. It is 
known that the R&D investment of domestic firms not only directly contributes to their 
productivity growth (Potterie and Lichtenberg, 2001; Basant and Fikkert, 1996) but also 
indirectly influences their growth by facilitating technology spillover from FDI (Kokko, 
1994; Alvarez and Molero, 2005). Therefore, the productivity of domestic firms could be 
positively affected by FDI if the FDI had a positive effect on domestic R&D investment; 
otherwise, it could be negatively affected. In fact, the linkage revealed by the “R&D im-
pact” hypothesis is one important component of the effect of FDI on the R&D investment 
of domestic firms, and then on their productivity growth. 
  The conclusions of most previous theoretical work pertaining to the “R&D im-
pact” hypothesis have been ambiguous. Sanna-Randaccio (2002) studied a two-country, 
two-firm problem in which each firm decides “the mode of foreign expansion; how much 
to invest in R&D; and how much to sell in each market.”  The equilibrium results proved 
that FDI has an ambiguous effect on domestic R&D. The author argued that the intensity 
of spillover, the technological characteristics of the firms, and the characteristics of the 
sector together shape the effect of FDI on domestic R&D.  
 Similarly, Haller (2004) investigated how the modes of entry of MNEs influenced 
the R&D decision of host country firms. The author found that the entry of a more effi-
cient foreign firm will lead to lower domestic R&D investment but higher total R&D in-
vestment in an industry. However, the author ruled out the possibility of spillover from 
the MNEs to the domestic firms in the theoretical analysis, which is the central argument 
in this paper.  
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 Petit and Sanna-Randaccio (2000) investigated the interaction between the mode 
of foreign expansion and the R&D investment decision of two competing firms in two 
countries. They found a positive relationship between multinational expansion and R&D 
investment and that R&D investment increases the likelihood of multinational expansion. 
Their model and the model we presented in the next section share some similarity in the 
model setup. Overall the findings of our model are consistent with theirs. That is, the im-
pact of foreign R&D on the R&D level of host country competitors is not strictly increas-
ing or decreasing, but dependent on the R&D spillover coefficients. However, their 
model is applicable to developed countries and consequently some key parameters in the 
model (e.g., innovation spillover coefficient) are set to be equal for competing firms. In 
our model, host country is an emerging economy. Naturally the spillover coefficients are 
different for host country firms and for multinationals. We discuss in more details the dif-
ference between our findings and theirs in the next Section.  
 Belderbos, Lykogianni, and Veugelers (2005) analyzed the strategic interaction in 
R&D internationalization decisions by two MNEs, a technology leader and a technology 
laggard. The authors investigated the role of local inter-firm R&D spillovers and interna-
tional intra-firm transfer of knowledge on the two firms’ R&D location decisions, that is, 
the share of a firm’s R&D resources allocated to that firm’s foreign subsidiary. They 
found that R&D localization of the two firms is strategic substitute. The reason is that 
increasing R&D at home improves a firm’s absorptive capacity, hence allows it to benefit 
more from the rival’s increasing local R&D level.  Furthermore, when inter-firm knowl-
edge spillover increases, technology leader allocates a larger share of R&D at home while 
technology laggard allocates a larger share of R&D abroad. When intra-firm international 
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knowledge transfers are more efficient both technology leader and laggard allocate a lar-
ger share of R&D abroad. 
 Empirical studies on the impact of FDI on the R&D investment of domestic firms 
by and large supported the theoretical propositions. Veugelers and Houte (1990) argued 
that MNEs in a host country may stimulate the innovative activities of domestic firms 
because of the potential knowledge spillovers. However, they also emphasized that com-
petition from the MNEs may limit their production scale and thus reduce domestic R&D 
expenditures. Their empirical analysis pointed to a significant negative effect of MNEs 
on the R&D expenditures of domestic firms in Belgium. Using industry level data of the 
United Kingdom, Driffield (2001) examined how the R&D investments of foreign and 
domestic firms affect the productivity growth of the domestic firms. The author found 
that the R&D investment of domestic firms has a significant positive effect on their pro-
ductivity growth but the R&D investment of foreign firms has an insignificant effect. 
Moreover, the author found that the R&D investment of foreign firms negatively affects 
the R&D investment of their domestic counterparts.  
 Different from the above literature, this study focuses on the impact of MNE 
R&D effort on host country firms in emerging economies, whose technological capabili-
ties are generally inferior to those of firms in developed economies.7 The intensity of 
MNE technology spillover and the influence of MNEs on the R&D intensity of domestic 
firms could differ in emerging economies, compared with those in advanced countries 
                                                 
7 Although Belderbos, Lykogianni and Veugelers (2005) differentiated technology leader 
and laggard in their study, they used a different approach to model the two types of firms. 
In their paper, leader has larger overall R&D resources than the laggard does, while in 
our case, the two types of firms have different R&D spillover coefficients. We did not 
follow their modeling approach because we do not possess the data to compare the total 
R&D resources of the two types of firms. 
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such as Belgium and the UK. Moreover, economists have generally considered FDI as 
the flow of homogeneous capital to host countries and studied their overall impact on the 
R&D investment of domestic firms without differentiating the diverse types of FDI. 
However, FDI that involves production or service supposedly influences local firms dif-
ferently from FDI that involves R&D activities. For example, so-called technology-
exploiting MNEs might employ mainly local low-skilled workers in their manufacturing 
plants; in contrast, technology-seeking MNEs may hire primarily highly-educated per-
sonnel such as engineers and scientists in their R&D centers8.  Accordingly, the mecha-
nism and magnitude of technology spillover as well as their impact on the R&D invest-
ment of local firms in these two types of MNEs might also differ.9  We view R&D in-
vestment of foreign firms in emerging economies as an advanced form of FDI and disen-
tangle its effect on the R&D effort of domestic firms from the overall impact of FDI.  
 Because of the important distinctions between this research and prior literature, 
we did not draw on the existing FDI spillover literature, which largely focuses on FDI in 
general rather than FDI in R&D in particular.  Instead, we build a simple model in the 
next section to develop a theoretical foundation for our analysis. Our intention is not to 
develop a theory, but to illustrate the underlying economic rationale within the context of 
this research.  
                                                 
8 According to Chung and Alcacer (2002), technology exploiting and technology seeking 
are two major motives of FDI. The former means that an MNE internalizes its unique ca-
pabilities and utilizes them in foreign countries; the latter means that an MNE expands 
abroad in search of capabilities that are not available in its home country.   
9 In surveys of literature characterizing the mechanisms through which spillover takes 
place, Blomstrom and Kokko (1998) and Saggi (2002) suggest that the labor mobility ef-
fect is one of the channels through which spillover may be realized. The other three 




3.2.2 A Model of Foreign and Domestic R&D Investment 
 
Consider m innovating domestic firms, n non-innovating domestic firms, f innovating 
MNEs (MNEs that innovate in the host country) and g non-innovating MNEs (MNEs that 
do not innovate in the host country) that operate in a homogeneous product market in a 
host country. Following Spencer and Brander (1983), the decision making process of the 
firms is modeled as a two-stage non-cooperative game (with no collusion).  In the first 
stage, the innovating firms simultaneously engage in cost-reducing R&D activities10.  In 
the second stage, all the firms participate in a Cournot competition11.  
 The marginal cost of production of both innovating and non-innovating MNEs is 
ĉF before the innovating MNEs invest in R&D in the host country. Similarly, the mar-
ginal cost of production of both innovating and non-innovating domestic firms is ĉD
12.  In 
the first stage, the innovating domestic firms and the MNEs simultaneously determine 
their cost-reducing R&D effort xi where i = 1, 2, …, m and xy where y = 1, 2, …, f. In ad-
dition to the cost reduction resulting from own R&D, an innovating domestic firm can 
reduce its production costs through absorbing R&D spillover from the innovating MNEs 
and other innovating domestic firms. As a result, an innovating domestic firm’s marginal 
production cost at the beginning of the second stage is ci (xi, XD, XF) = ĉD - xi – α (XD- xi) - 
                                                 
10 We study cost-reducing R&D because many MNEs offshore their business to China in 
order to reduce production cost, though MNEs could offshore R&D for the purpose of 
new product development as well. We need to assume a heterogeneous product market in 
the model if our focus is product innovation.   
11 Cournot competition is a reasonable assumption in our setting because it is fairly diffi-
cult to adjust capacity in the IT manufacturing industry. For instance, semi-conductor 
sector is known to have long lead-time for capacity expansion (Karabuk and Wu, 2003).  
12 In the rest of the paper, we use subscripts F and D to denote the MNE and the domestic 
firms, respectively. 
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αFXF. XD is the aggregate R&D effort of innovating domestic firms, and XD = ∑i=1 to m xi. 
XF is the aggregate R&D effort of innovating MNEs, and XF = ∑y=1 to f  xy.  αF < α <1. α 
represents how easily an innovating domestic firm can absorb R&D spillover from other 
innovating domestic firms; in other words, it represents how easily an innovating domes-
tic firm can learn from the R&D activities of other innovating domestic firms. Similarly, 
αF represents how easily an innovating domestic firm can learn from the R&D activities 
of innovating MNEs. A non-innovating domestic firm’s marginal production cost at the 
beginning of the second stage is cj (XD, XF) = ĉD - β XD – βF XF, j = 1, 2,…, n and β < α, 
βF < αF, βF < β. β represents how easily a non-innovating domestic firm can learn from 
the R&D activities of innovating domestic firms. βF represents how easily a non-
innovating domestic firm can learn from the R&D activities of innovating MNEs. The 
MNEs can take in local technological expertise as well. The marginal production cost of 
an innovating MNE at the beginning of the second stage is cy (xy, XD, XF) = ĉF – xy – γ 
(XF- xy) - γDXD
 13; γD < γ <1. γ represents how easily an innovating MNE can absorb R&D 
spillover from other innovating MNEs. γD represents its capability of exploiting local 
technological know-how. The marginal production cost of a non-innovating MNE at the 
beginning of the second stage is cz (XD, XF) = ĉF – δ XF - δDXD, z = 1, 2,…, g and δD < δ 
<1, δ < γ, and  δD < γD. δ represents how easily a non-innovating MNE can absorb R&D 
spillover from innovating MNEs. δD represents its capability of exploiting local techno-
logical know-how. 
                                                 
13 We consider the R&D investment of domestic firms as the only source of local techno-
logical expertise in order to simplify the analysis, though the MNE can exploit local 
technological expertise in other ways, such as collaboration with local universities and 
research institutes (Thursby and Thursby 2006). 
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 Following D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), we assume the costs of R&D to 




/2 for an innovating domestic firm and an 
innovating MNE, respectively. We use the same parameter θ for the MNE and the do-
mestic firm because they employ the same pool of resources for their R&D activities 
(D’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988)14.   
 In the second stage of the game, all the firms engage in a Cournot competition in 
which each firm determines its production quantity q conditional on xi where i = 1, 2, …, 
m and xy where y = 1, 2, …, f. The inverse demand function is modeled as p = a- bQ, 
where Q = ∑i=1 to m qi + ∑j=1 to n qj + ∑y=1 to f  qy + ∑z=1 to g  qz and p denote the market clear 
price. The model is solved backwards so that the subgame perfect equilibria are obtained.   
 
3.2.3 Nash-Cournot Equilibrium  
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),(** −−= for an innovating domestic firm, non-innovating domestic 
                                                 
14 We do not assume that the MNE is more efficient in R&D than the domestic firm, i.e., 
θy < θi, because it is not clear whether this is the case in the IT sector in China. Moreover, 
incorporating this constraint into the model would not change the main findings. To keep 
it simple, we choose to stay with θy = θi = θ.   
15 The fixed cost of production is normalized to zero. The subscripts of q, c and x are 
omitted and represent the corresponding variables for each firm among the four types of 
firms. As a result, equation (1) represents m + n + f + g equations.  
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We assume no exit option in the game, i.e., q* > 0, because we are interested in the rela-
tionship between the decision of the MNEs and that of the domestic firms.  
 
3.2.4 Equilibrium of R&D Effort 
 
Going back to the first stage, the objective functions for the innovating domestic firms 
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Assuming symmetry in innovating domestic firms, there are unique optimal solutions for 
xi when α is sufficiently large
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Again, assuming symmetry in innovating MNEs, there are unique optimal solutions for xy 
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3.2.5 Interaction between R&D Effort of MNEs and Host Country Firms 
 
We derive the relationship between xy and xi by differentiating the left-hand side of equa-
tion (4) with respect to xy: 
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α . This implies 
that the R&D efforts of the innovating MNEs have a positive effect on the R&D efforts 
of the innovating domestic firms if it is sufficiently easy for the domestic firm to learn 
from the MNEs.  However, the R&D effort of the MNEs has a negative effect if it is dif-
ficult for the domestic firms to learn from the MNEs19. This is consistent with the find-
ings in Petit and Sanna-Randaccio (2000). Furthermore, the threshold of spillover coeffi-
cient is dependent on the ease for non-innovating domestic firms to learn from foreign 
R&D investment and the ease for foreign firms to learn from innovating MNEs, suggest-
ing the importance of considering the difference in spillover coefficients among firms. 
This is different from the findings in Petit and Sanna-Randaccio (2000)20.    
                                                 
19 This is different from the findings of Belderbos, Lykogianni and Veugelers (2005).  
Belderbos, Lykogianni and Veugelers (2005) found that host country firms lower their 
R&D level if foreign competitors increase their R&D level in the host country. The dif-
ference is due to the model setup. In our model, the competition effect may offset the 
spillover effect, leading to a threshold in the spillover coefficient of host country firms, 
below which the competition effect dominates, and above which the spillover effect 
dominates. Belderbos, Lykogianni and Veugelers (2005) also considered product market 
competition, but competition in their model refers to global competition, which is the 
overall competition in the two countries. While in our case, we study a one-country prob-
lem where host country firms do not expand abroad. As a result, the increased competi-
tion due to the entry of foreign competitors hurts the market share of host country firms, 
which lowers their incentive to innovate.  
20 The spillover coefficient is the same for competing firms in Petit and Sanna-Randaccio 
(2000). 
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 We examine the rationale behind these results by inspecting how the R&D efforts 



































 The first multiplicative expression in equation (7) is always positive and repre-
sents a spillover effect:  Because an innovating domestic firm absorbs the R&D spillover 
from the MNEs, it is able to reduce its cost and raise its output. The second expression is 
always negative and represents a competition effect:  Although an increase in the R&D 
efforts of a MNE cuts its own production cost, it indirectly raises the costs of the domes-
tic firms, leading to a decrease in its output. The two processes compete with each other, 
and the observed result is their net effect.  
 To summarize, when it is sufficiently easy for the domestic firms to learn from 
the MNEs, that is, when absorbing R&D spillover from the MNEs is easy, the spillover 
effect dominates the competition effect, leading to a net positive effect of the MNE R&D 
offshoring on the R&D effort of the domestic firms. When it is difficult for the domestic 
firms to learn from the MNEs, the competition effect dominates the spillover effect, lead-
ing to a net negative effect of the MNE R&D offshoring. In general, how easily the do-
mestic firms learn from the MNEs determines the net impact of the two competing fac-
tors.  
  
3.3 Empirical Evidence from the IT Sector  
 
3.3.1 Data 




















The dataset used in this study was constructed by the National Bureau of Statistics of 
China on a yearly basis from 2001 to 2005. The cleaned dataset includes 4,506 firms in 
the 2001 data, 4,834 in the 2002 data, 5,565 in the 2003 data, and 8,525 in the 2005 data22, 
totaling  12,309 manufacturing firms in the two-digit electronic and telecommunication 
(IT) sector. Each firm is assigned an invariant code in the dataset so that we can match 
the observations of each firm across the four-year observation period. The dataset con-
tains more than 50 statistical indicators, including firm input, output, R&D expenditures, 
capital composition, employment, geographical location, the sector in which a firm oper-
ates (at four-digit sector level), ownership status, and assets and liabilities. 
 The IT industry in China is an excellent example for our empirical research. First, 
China’s IT sector has developed rapidly in recent years.  The main driver of the develop-
ment of the Chinese IT sector has been the rapid development of domestic firms and the 
inflow of foreign investment to this industry. China’s trade volume of IT products in-
creased from 35 billion US Dollars in 1996 to 180 billion US Dollars in 2004, with an 
average annual growth rate of 38 percent (OECD, 2005). China is now the sixth strongest 
global IT market. Meng and Li (2002) documented that 47 percent of electronic products 
manufactured at the end of the 1990’s in China were produced by foreign firms or joint 
ventures. Having transferred their manufacturing branches to China to reduce production 
costs, a majority of MNEs in the IT sector imported the critical components normally de-
veloped in advanced countries, assembled the products in China, and exported the final 
                                                 
22Data is cleaned by deleting the observations with negative industrial output value, em-
ployee number, sales volume, industrial added value, and R&D investment value. The 
data in 2004 are not included in this analysis because of the lack of R&D investment 
value. 
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products to overseas market.23  Because of this so-called “processing trade”, China be-
came the biggest exporter of IT goods in the world in 2004 (OECD, 2005; Katsuno, 
2005).  
 Another reason why the IT industry is an excellent example for this research is the 
considerable competition and interaction between foreign firms and local competitors in 
the Chinese IT industry. In spite of their relatively limited size and technological know-
how, Chinese domestic IT firms are rapidly developing their production, export, and 
R&D capabilities. After all, they compete effectively with MNEs in various product mar-
kets within China, and several of them, active in overseas markets, have even emerged as 
global players24. 
 
3.3.2 Econometric Framework  
  
To test how the R&D effort of MNEs affects local firms, we adopt the following general 
econometric framework in the empirical analysis. 
(8) (R&D intensity of domestic firm) jit = f {(R&D intensity of MNEs)jt, (control variables) 
jit } , 
where i, j, t represent a firm, a four-digit level industry, and time, respectively. The data 
for the variable of the R&D intensity of a domestic firm and the control variables are at 
the firm level, but those for R&D intensity of MNEs are at a four-digit industry level. 
                                                 
23 Research by Lemoine and Unal-Kesenci (2004), China’s National Bureau of Statistics 
(2005), and Fung (2005) attributed the recent expansion of China’s exports in machinery, 
electrical equipment, and electronic products, in large part to processing trade and the 
global division of labor, especially in East Asia.   
24 Examples include Lenovo, which acquired the IBM personal computer business in 
2004 and became the world’s third largest personal computer producer, TCL, which ac-
quired the television business of Thomson in France in late 2003, and Huawei and ZTE, 
which are active players in the worldwide telecommunications equipment market. 
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 In this framework, we use the R&D intensity of a domestic firm, i.e., the ratio of 
R&D expenditures to sales value, as the dependent variable. The average R&D intensity 
of foreign firms at the four-digit industry sector level enters the right-hand side of the 
function as a key independent variable25.  
 Since the R&D intensity of a firm is influenced by not only its foreign competi-
tors but also many other factors, we include these factors as control variables in the re-
gression. We discuss the control variables in detail in Section 3.3.2.2. 
 The theoretical model in Section 3.2 implies that how the R&D effort of MNEs in 
a host country impacts the R&D decision of domestic firms depends on the ease of learn-
ing in the domestic firms, i.e., how difficult it is for spillover to take place. The difficulty 
of testing the propositions lies in measuring the ease of learning in the domestic firms and 
constructing the key independent variables. We discuss the measurement issue and our 
approach of constructing the key independent variables in Section 3.3.2.1.  
 
3.3.2.1 Measurement of Ease of Learning and Construction of MNE R&D Intensity  
 
 
Kaiser (2002) reviewed several different methodologies of constructing knowledge spill-
over variables. These include measuring the technological distance between firms by the 
patent activities (Jaffe, 1986) and share of scientists in a firm (Adams, 1990), and meas-
                                                 
25 R&D intensity has been commonly used in the literature to measure R&D effort of a 
firm (e.g., Veugelers and Vanden Houte (1990), and Cohen and Klepper (1992)). In our 
model presented in Section 3.2, we use x to denote R&D effort and we investigate the 
interaction between the R&D efforts of domestic firms and MNEs. Correspondingly, 
R&D intensity is equivalent to θx2/2q and the behavior of R&D intensity of domestic 













*). That is, 
there is a threshold value in αF, above which the spillover effect dominates the competi-
tion effect, while below which the latter dominates the former. We present our analysis in 
Appendix A.   
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uring the Euclidean distance of firm characteristics (Inkmann and Pohlmeier, 1995).  Or-
naghi (2006) measured the ease of spillover by grouping firms according to their size, 
R&D expenditures, and geographical location.  
 In this paper, we measure ease of learning of a domestic firm using both the tech-
nological and geographical distance between the subsidiary company of an MNE in 
China and local firms. We use labor productivity to construct technological distance since 
we do not have firm-level data on patent applications and employed scientists in our data-
set.  Moreover, although we possess data about size and R&D expenditures of the sub-
sidiaries of MNEs, we hesitate to use them as indicators of the technology level of the 
foreign firms because this information represents only the characteristics of their subsidi-
aries in China, rather than their overall technology capability. Labor productivity, defined 
as added value divided by number of employees, represents the technology and manage-
ment skills of a manufacturing firm in general.  
 To test the effect of technological distance on the relationship between the R&D 
intensity of MNEs and domestic firms, we construct three variables—R&D intensity of 
same-group MNEs, R&D intensity of higher-level-group MNEs, and R&D intensity of 
lower-level-group MNEs — and include them as key independent variables in our analy-
sis.  We follow Ornaghi (2006) to divide the dataset into five subsets (groups) according 
to the average labor productivity of all firms during the observation period. Each of the 
groups contains one-fifth of the firms in the dataset26. Suppose a domestic firm is classi-
                                                 
26 In this study, a firm classified in a relatively high-labor productivity group would be 
equipped with more advanced machinery and equipment or have established a more effi-
cient organizational and management structure. 
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fied in the group with the lowest labor productivity27. Then the average R&D intensity of 
the foreign firms in the same lowest labor productivity group and in the same four-digit 
sector of the domestic firm is taken as the value of the variable R&D intensity of same-
group MNEs for this domestic firm. Similarly, we construct this variable for the domestic 
firms in the other four groups. The variable R&D intensity of higher-level-group MNEs 
is constructed by taking the average R&D intensity of the foreign firms in a group with 
higher labor productivity, compared with the group of the domestic firm, and are also in 
the same four-digit sector of the domestic firm. For example, suppose a domestic firm is 
in Group 1. For this domestic firm, the variable R&D intensity of higher-level-group 
MNEs is calculated by taking the average R&D intensity of the foreign firms in Group 2 
and in the same four-digit sector of the domestic firm. For a domestic firm in Group 2, 
the average R&D intensity of the foreign firms in Group 3 and in the same four-digit sec-
tor of the domestic firm is taken as the value of the variable. Different from Ornaghi 
(2006), we take 1 as the value of the variable  R&D intensity of higher-level- group 
MNEs for a domestic firm in Group 5, i.e., the group with the highest labor productivity, 
because 1 represents the upper bound of the R&D intensity of a firm. This numerical ma-
nipulation is justified by the analysis of the data presented in Table 3.1. Table 3.1 shows 
that foreign firms in the groups of higher labor productivity generally have higher R&D 
intensity. Similarly, we construct the variable R&D intensity of lower-level-group MNEs 
by entering the average R&D intensity of the foreign firms in the group directly below 
the group of the domestic firm. For example, for a domestic firm in Group 2, the average 
R&D intensity of the foreign firms in Group 1 and in the same four-digit sector of the 
                                                 
27 The labor productivity of Groups 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 is in an ascending order, i.e., Group 1 has 
the lowest labor productivity, and Group 5 has the highest labor productivity. 
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domestic firm is taken as the value of the variable R&D intensity of lower-level-group 
MNEs.  For a domestic firm in Group 1, i.e., the group of lowest labor productivity, 0 is 
taken as the value of the variable because foreign firms in the group of lower productivity 
tend to have lower R&D intensity (Table 3.1). The methodology of constructing the vari-
ables of R&D intensity of same-group MNEs, R&D intensity of higher-level-group 
MNEs, and R&D intensity of lower–level-group MNEs is summarized in Table 3.2. 
Incorporating the three variables into our general econometric framework, we fur-
ther identify our econometric function as: 
(9)  (R&D intensity of domestic firm) jit = f {(R&D intensity of same-group MNEs)jt, 
(R&D intensity of higher-level- group MNEs)jt, (R&D intensity of lower-level-group 
MNEs)jt, (control variables) jit}, 
where i, j, t represent a firm, a four-digit level industry, and time, respectively. 
 By constructing the variables and estimating the coefficients of R&D intensity of 
same-group MNEs, R&D intensity of higher-level-group MNEs, and R&D intensity of 
lower-level-group MNEs, we can identify how foreign firms with different levels of 
technology and management capabilities affect the R&D effort of domestic firms. In 
other words, we can test how the technological distance between domestic and foreign 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 We are also interested in how this impact differs between domestic firms with 
high and low technological and management capabilities. Therefore, we analyze 
Equation 9 by running the regression on four sub-samples of domestic firms sepa-
rately. The first sub-sample includes domestic firms of Groups 1 (the lowest labor 
productivity group), 2, 3, and 4, and excludes domestic firms of Group 5 (the highest 
labor productivity). The second sub-sample includes domestic firms of Groups 1, 2, 
and 3, and excludes domestic firms of Groups 4 and 5. Regressing on the two sub-
samples separately allows us to focus on domestic firms with relatively low technol-
ogy and management capabilities and to examine the effect of technology distance on 
the relationship between the R&D intensities of these domestic firms and those of 
MNEs. By the same token, we run regressions using the other two sub-samples that 
focus on domestic firms with relatively high technology and management capabilities. 
The third sub-sample includes domestic firms of Groups 2, 3, 4, and 5, and excludes 
the domestic firms of Group 1; the fourth sub-sample includes the domestic firms of 
Groups 3, 4, and 5 and excludes the domestic firms of Groups 1 and 2. The regression 
functions that differentiate the two types of domestic firms are presented in the fol-
lowing: 
(10) (R&D intensity of low-capability domestic firm) jit = f {( R&D intensity of same-
group MNEs)jt, (R&D intensity of higher-level-group MNEs)jt, (R&D intensity of 
lower-level-group MNEs)jt, (control variables) jit}, 
and 
(11) (R&D intensity of high-capability domestic firm) jit = f {( R&D intensity of same-
group MNEs)jt, (R&D intensity of higher-level-group MNEs)jt, (R&D intensity of 
lower-level-group MNEs)jt, (control variables) jit}, 
where i, j, t represent a firm, a four-digit level industry, and time, respectively. 
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 Because different industry sectors differ in their production function and labor 
productivity of firms in some industry sectors are intrinsically higher than in other 
sectors, grouping firms using labor productivity without considering this natural dif-
ference between industry sectors may generate noise in the analysis. For example, a 
firm with relatively high labor productivity in its industry sector may be placed in the 
group of low-capability because the sector it belongs to has low labor productivity 
and, a firm with relatively low labor productivity may be placed in the group of high-
capability because it belongs to a sector with high labor productivity. Following the 
survey of current business by Bureau of Economic Analysis on research and devel-
opment satellite account28, we separate technology-intensive industry sectors from 
labor-intensive sectors and estimate the coefficients for the two types of industry sec-
tors separately. We compare the estimation with the full sample results in Section 
3.3.4.     
 To examine the robustness of the results obtained by classifying the firms into 
five groups, we also divide the firms into three groups, each of which contains one-
third of all the firms, and then estimate the coefficients. We compare the estimation of 
the five- and three-group approaches in Section 3.3.4.  
 Another type of “distance” between domestic and foreign firms is geographi-
cal distance. We make use of the geographical code in the dataset to identify the geo-
graphical location of each firm. We construct three additional variables: R&D Inten-
sity of MNEs within a City, R&D Intensity of MNEs within a Province, and R&D 
Intensity of MNEs within Neighboring Provinces. For a domestic firm, R&D Intensity 
of MNEs within a City is the average R&D intensity of foreign firms that are in the 
same four-digit sector and in the same city of the domestic firm. R&D Intensity of 
                                                 
28 The complete survey can be downloaded at www.bea.gov. 
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MNEs within a Province is the average R&D intensity of foreign firms that are in the 
same four-digit sector, in the same province, but in a different city of the domestic 
firm. By the same token, R&D Intensity of MNEs within Neighboring Provinces is 
the average R&D intensity of foreign firms that are in the same four-digit sector, 
within the area of the same province plus neighboring provinces29, but in a different 
city of the domestic firm. Foreign firms encompassed by the variable R&D Intensity 
of MNEs within Neighboring Provinces are spread throughout a wider area than those 
included in the calculation of variable R&D Intensity of MNEs within a Province. The 
geographical areas covered by these two variables overlap, but they are mutually ex-
clusive to the area covered by the variable R&D Intensity of MNEs within a City.  As 
a result, the variables R&D Intensity of MNEs within a Province and R&D Intensity 
of MNEs within Neighboring Provinces enter the regression separately. The regres-
sion functions are presented in the following: 
(12) (R&D intensity of domestic firm) jit = f {( R&D Intensity of MNEs within a City)jt, 
(R&D Intensity of MNEs within a Province)jt, (control variables) jit}, 
and 
(13) (R&D intensity of domestic firm) jit = f {( R&D Intensity of MNEs within a City)jt, 
(R&D Intensity of MNEs within Neighboring Provinces)jt, (control variables) jit}, 
where i, j, t represent a firm, a four-digit level industry and time, respectively. 
 Our dataset shows that among all the provinces, Guangdong province hosts the 
largest number of foreign and domestic IT firms. Shanghai and Jiangsu follow to host 
the second and third largest number of IT firms. However, the number of firms lo-
cated in Guangdong is higher than that in Shanghai and Jiangsu combined. Given the 
importance of Guangdong province to the Chinese IT industry, we single out the data 
                                                 
29 The list of neighboring provinces for each province in our data is presented in Table 
B.1 in Appendix B. 
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of the firms located in Guangdong and compare the results based on these data to the 
results obtained from the full sample. 
 
3.3.2.2 Control Variables 
 
Since more financial resources allow a firm greater opportunity to experiment and less 
stringent requirements for performance, they contribute to risky investments in R&D.  
That is, the more financial resources a firm has, the more likely it will invest in R&D 
or increase R&D investment. Following studies on slack resources by Greve (2003), 
Daniel et al. (2004) and Tan and Peng (2004), we include the ratio of administrative, 
financial, and selling expenses to sales value in the function to measure the financial 
resources of a firm. 
 Schumpeter (1950) was among the first to hypothesize that large firms in a 
mature capitalist economy generate a disproportionately large share of society’s tech-
nological advances. Scholars who support this hypothesis have articulated that larger 
firms possess larger-scale, internally-generated funds, so they secure more resources 
with which to conduct risky R&D projects. Scale economies of R&D activity and re-
turn to R&D investment given a larger volume of sales also contribute to the advan-
tage of larger firms. However, Cohen et al. (1987) argued that these points were 
flawed because of inadequate attention to the unit of analysis and to industry effects. 
They found that overall firm size has a very small, statistically insignificant effect on 
business unit R&D intensity. In a recent study, Lee and Sung (2005) contested that 
firm size does not directly affect R&D intensity, but it does exert influence by affect-
ing firm-specific technological competence. Although no consensus was reached on 
the relationship between firm size and R&D intensity in previous literature, we in-
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clude the number of employees of a firm divided by the average number of the em-
ployees of all firms in the database as a control variable in our analysis. 
 Before conducting R&D activities, a firm must first invest in sophisticated 
technological equipment (Del Canto and Gonzalez, 1999).  Investment in R&D 
equipment, similar to investment in ordinary machinery and production, is typically 
classified as fixed asset investment. A firm investing more in fixed assets, i.e. having 
higher capital intensity, is more likely to expand its R&D investment.   Therefore, we 
include the ratio of fixed asset investment to added value as an explanatory variable to 
control for the effect of capital intensity on R&D intensity. 
 Committed to fixed asset investment in R&D equipment, a firm also has to 
invest in human capital to build an efficient R&D team consisting of scientists and 
technicians with the proper qualifications, knowledge, and skills. Their experience 
and knowledge constitute the human resources of the firm, which contribute to the 
success of R&D projects. Following Del Canto and Gonzalez (1999), we use compen-
sation per employee of the firm, which is the total compensation divided by the num-
ber of employees, as a proxy variable for the human resources of the firm.  
 The relationship between industry R&D intensity and market structure has 
been extensively investigated in the literature of industrial organization. According to 
Lee (2005), a number of studies found that the relationship between industry R&D 
intensity and market concentration can be described as an inverted-U shape. This in-
dicates that moderately concentrated industries invest more in R&D activity than ei-
ther highly competitive or highly concentrated industries. Bearing this in mind, we 
include in the regression a variable of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Industrial Concentra-
tion Index (HHI), calculated at the four-digit sector level, to account for the potential 
impact of market structure on a firm’s R&D intensity.   
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 We also include several ownership, industry and year dummy variables in the 
functions to control for ownership, industry and time effect, respectively. The defini-
tions of all the dependent and independent variables are summarized in Table 3.3, and 
the descriptive statistics of the variables are displayed in Table 3.4. 
 
3.3.3 Estimation Methodology 
 
3.3.3.1 Censored Dependent Variable 
 
More than half of the domestic firms in our dataset did not conduct R&D during the 
observation period, so the R&D intensity of these firms was zero. This type of de-
pendent variable is known as a “censored dependent variable,” i.e., the values of the 
variable in a certain range are all reported as a single value, e.g., zero. Conventional 
linear regression method is not able to distinguish between non-linear “zero” observa-
tions and continuous observations.  Thus, we use the Tobit model as our baseline 
model. Moreover, although some time-invariant characteristics of domestic firms 
could also affect the dependent variable, their impact is not captured by the baseline 
Tobit model. Therefore, we run a panel Tobit model to control for these unobserved 
firm-specific factors. 
 
3.3.3.2 Endogenous Independent Variables 
 
The theoretical model presented in Section 3.2 clearly shows that the R&D intensity 
of foreign firms is endogenous in structural functions because of strategic interaction 
between a foreign firm and a domestic firm. To correct the bias caused by endogene-
ity of the explanatory variable, we instrument the R&D intensity of foreign firms with 




Table 3.3: Variables 
Variable Name Definition and Note 
Domestic Firm R&D Inten-
sity (Dependent Variable) 
R&D expenditure of a domestic firm / Sales value of a domestic firm 
Domestic Firm R&D Inten-
sity at Four-digit Sector 
Level (Independent Vari-
able) 
Sum of R&D expenditure of domestic firms in the same four-digit sector / Sum 
of sales value of domestic firms in the same four-digit sector 
R&D intensity of same-
group MNEs1 
Sum of R&D expenditure of MNEs in the same four-digit sector / Sum of sales 
value of MNEs in the same four-digit Sector (The MNEs are classified into the 
same labor productivity group as the group of domestic firms) 
R&D intensity of higher-
level-group MNEs 1 
Sum of R&D expenditure of MNEs in the same four-digit sector / Sum of sales 
value of MNEs in the same four-digit Sector (The MNEs are classified into a 
higher labor productivity group compared with the group of domestic firms) 
R&D intensity of lower-
level-group MNEs 1 
Sum of R&D expenditure of MNEs in the same four-digit sector / Sum of sales 
value of MNEs in the same four-digit Sector (The MNEs are classified into a 
lower labor productivity group compared with the group of domestic firms) 
Financial Resource Administrative, financial and selling expenses / Sales 
Firm Size Number of employees / Average number of employees of firms in the sample 
Fixed Asset Investment In-
tensity 
Fixed asset investment /Added value 
Human Resource Employee compensation value / Number of employees 
Herfindahl-Hirschman In-






( Market share (Percentage) of j firm in a four-digit sector)2 
Ownership Dummy Vari-
ables 
For domestic firms, the base group is “other domestic firms”. The dummy vari-
ables represent state-owned, collective, employee shareholding cooperatives, 
joint operation enterprises, limited liability companies, stock companies, private 
enterprises. 
Year Dummy Variables The base group is 2001. The dummy variables represent 2002, 2003 and 2005. 
Industry Dummy Variables 
The base group is Audio and Video Equipment. The dummy variables represent 
Computer and peripheral equipment, Communications Equipment, Semiconduc-
tor and related device, Radio and Television Broadcasting Equipment, Electronic 
and Communications Equipment Repairing, and Other Electronic Component 
MNE R&D Intensity within 
a City 
Average R&D intensity of MNEs that are in the same four-digit sector and within 
the same city or county of domestic firms. 
MNE R&D Intensity within 
a Province 
Average R&D investment intensity of MNEs that are in the same four-digit sec-
tor, in the same province but in a different city or county of domestic firms. 
MNE R&D Intensity within 
Neighboring Provinces 
Average R&D intensity of MNEs that are in the same four-digit sector, within 
the area of the same province plus neighboring provinces but in a different city or 
county of domestic firms. 
MNE new-product intensity 
Sum of new product value of MNEs in the same four-digit sector / Sum of output 
value of MNEs in the same four-digit Sector 
Ratio of the administrative, 
financial and selling ex-
penses to sales value of 
MNE 
Sum of administrative, financial, and selling expenses of MNEs in the same four-
digit sector / Sum of sales value of MNEs in the same four-digit Sector 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































by the industrial output, and the ratio of administrative, financial, and selling expenses 
to sales value.  
Legitimate instrumental variables need to be highly correlated with the en-
dogenous variable but not correlated with the residual of the structural function. R&D 
activity leads to the development of new products, so R&D intensity is correlated with 
new product development. However, R&D intensity of a host country firm in a par-
ticular four-digit sector could not substantially impact the average new product inten-
sity of all the MNEs in that sector. In this sense, new-product intensity is a qualified 
instrumental variable. In Section 3.3.2.2, we argued that a firm’s financial resources 
contribute to its decision to invest in R&D. Therefore, R&D intensity is highly corre-
lated with the variable measuring a firm’s financial capability. Furthermore, R&D de-
cision of a host country firm can hardly affect the average ratio of the administrative, 
financial, and selling expenses to the sales value of all the MNEs in the same four-
digit industry sector. Therefore, the ratio of administrative, financial, and selling ex-
penses to sales value is a valid instrument variable of the R&D intensity of foreign 
firms. The definition of the two instrumental variables is also summarized in Table 
3.3. 
 
3.3.3.3 Sample Selection 
 
Our panels of firm-level data might suffer under selection bias. That is, we only ob-
serve R&D data for firms that choose to invest in R&D. If the missing R&D data 
(how much would firms that currently have zero R&D investment invest in R&D if 
they choose to do so) were missing at random, regular estimation methods would be 
fine. However, if the missing R&D data were not missing at random, that is, the dis-
turbance in the equation of whether firms would invest in R&D is correlated with the 
 
69 
disturbance in the equation of how much firms would investment in R&D if they 
choose to do so, estimation methods that ignore this correlation may lead to biased 
estimates of regression parameters.   
 We follow a two-stage Heckman procedure to correct the regression for sam-
ple selection. In the first stage, the selection equation is estimated for each of the ob-
servation periods. Following Veugelers and Cassiman (1999) we regress whether a 
firm has positive R&D intensity on the following independent variables: size, export 
intensity, financial resources, market structure, and ownership dummies. In the second 
stage, we correct the selection bias and estimate equation (9) using the selected sam-
ple for each of the observation periods30.     
 
3.3.4 Empirical Results  
 
The estimation results of Function 9 are presented in Table 3.5.  The coefficients of 
R&D intensity of higher-level-group MNEs are significant and positive in three of the 
four regression models. The coefficients of R&D intensity of lower-level-group 
MNEs and R&D intensity of same-group MNEs are significant and positive in one of  
the four regression models. To correct the endogeneity of explanatory variables, we 
instrument the two statistically significant variables in the Tobit model results, i.e. 
R&D intensity of higher-level-group MNEs and R&D intensity of lower-level-group 
MNEs in the three-group results, and report the instrumental variable regression re-
sults in Table 3.6.  The table shows that R&D intensity of higher-level-group MNEs 
and R&D intensity of lower-level-group MNEs are all maintained to be statistically 
significant in instrumental variable Tobit models. The results of Heckman selection
                                                 
30 Heckman selection model is rarely used in a panel data environment in the existing 
empirical literature. Theoretical studies on how to obtain consistent estimator of a 
panel data sample selection model can be found in Wooldridge (1995), Kyriazidou 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































regression are reported in Table 3.6. The null hypothesis of sample selection is re-
jected for each of the observation periods. The corrected results show that R&D inten-
sity of same-group MNEs and R&D intensity of higher-level-group MNEs are statis-
tically significant in 2005 and 2001 respectively. The coefficients of R&D intensity of 
lower-level-group MNEs become insignificant during the observation periods.  
 Overall, the robust positive signs of R&D intensity of higher-level-group 
MNEs indicate that R&D offshoring of MNEs stimulated R&D effort of domestic 
firms in the IT industry in China. Moreover, the R&D effort of domestic firms is 
mainly influenced by foreign firms with higher technological and management capa-
bilities, implying relatively strong learning from foreign firms with higher capabilities. 
 In addition, the results presented in Table 3.5 reveal that a host country firm 
with greater financial resources, a larger size, and more R&D human resources is 
more likely to invest more in R&D. However, contradictory to our prediction, a firm 
investing more in fixed assets tends to invest less in R&D. Neither the average R&D 
intensity of host country firms in the four-digit sector nor the industrial concentration 
index has statistically significant influence on R&D decisions of an individual firm. 
We also find that limited liability and stock companies tend to invest more in R&D 
than firms of other ownership status.  The R&D effort level of domestic firms in 2001 
exhibited a statistically significant difference from that of domestic firms in 2002, but 
it did not between 2001 and 2003 or between 2001 and 2005. 
Since Tobit model estimates the effect of change in explanatory variables on 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































constant, marginal effect is calculated and reported in Table 3.7
31
. Table 3.7 shows 
that in the 5-Group analysis, an increase of .1 in the R&D intensity of foreign firms 
with higher capabilities will lead to an increase of .0001 in the R&D intensity of a 
domestic firm, holding other explanatory variables constant. In the 3-Group analysis, 
an increase of .1 in the R&D intensity of foreign firms with higher capabilities will 
cause an increase of .0003 in the R&D intensity of a domestic firm.  
We present the regression results of Functions 10 and 11 in Tables 3.8 using 
both the five-group and the three-group approaches. Panel A in Table 3.8 shows that 
when we use the sub-sample of domestic firms with relatively low technology and 
management capability (domestic firms in Groups 1, 2, 3, and 4 or Groups 1, 2, and 3 
in the five-group approach and domestic firms in Group 1 and 2 in the three-group 
approach) in the regression, the coefficients of R&D intensity of higher-level-group 
and same-group MNEs are insignificant; however, the coefficients of R&D intensity 
of lower-level-group MNEs are generally significant and positive in the regressions. 
When we use the sub-sample of domestic firms with relatively high technology and 
management capability (domestic firms in Groups 2, 3, 4 and 5 or Groups 3, 4, and 5 
in the five-group approach and domestic firms in Group 2 and 3 in the three-group 
approach) in the regression (Panel B in Table 3.8), the coefficients of R&D intensity 
of lower-level-group and same-group MNEs are insignificant; however, the coeffi-
cients of R&D intensity of higher-level-group MNEs are generally significant and 
positive in the regressions.  
To summarize, although the overall impact of MNE R&D offshoring on the 
R&D effort of domestic IT firms is positive, its influence differs between domestic 
firms with high and low technology and management capabilities. The R&D effort of
                                                 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































low-capability domestic firms is only influenced by the R&D intensity of lower-level-
group MNEs; and the R&D effort of high-capability domestic firms is only influenced 
by the R&D intensity of higher-level-group MNEs.  
 To examine whether the results still hold if we include in the analysis the dif-
ference in industrial labor productivity, we separate the analysis for technology-
intensive and labor-intensive industry sectors and present the results in Table 3.9 
through Table 3.11.  Table 3.9 shows the estimation results of equation 9 for technol-
ogy-intensive and labor-intensive industries. R&D intensity of higher-level-group 
MNEs has a significant and positive impact on the R&D effort of domestic firms in 
both technology-intensive and labor-intensive industry sectors. This is consistent with 
the results using the full sample. Moreover, R&D effort of domestic IT firms in labor-
intensive industry sectors also increases with the R&D intensity of lower-level-group 
MNEs. The results after correcting the endogeneity of explanatory variables and the 
sample selection bias (Table 3.10) in general support the results presented in Table 
3.9.  
 Table 3.11 reports the results of equations 10 and 11 for technology- and la-
bor-intensive industry sectors. R&D effort of low-capability domestic firms in both 
types of industry sectors increases with the R&D intensity of lower-level-group 
MNEs; and R&D effort of high-capability domestic firms increases with the R&D 
intensity of higher-level-group MNEs. This is completely consistent with the results 
using full sample.  
 Overall the analysis of firms in technology- and labor-intensive industries 
proves that the findings using full sample are robust. That is, R&D effort of domestic 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































capability domestic firms is primarily influenced by the R&D intensity of higher-
level-group MNEs; the R&D effort of low-capability domestic firms is mainly influ-
enced by the R&D intensity of lower-level-group MNEs. The positive impact of 
higher-level group MNEs on high-capability domestic firms is intuitive and implies 
that high-capability domestic firms have the capability to learn much from MNEs 
with higher capability. The positive impact of lower-level group MNEs on low-
capability domestic firms could be driven by potential threat of foreign firms in 
lower-level-group to a low-capability domestic firm32.     
 The regression results of Functions 12 and 13 are presented in Table 3.12. The 
regression using the full sample reveals significant and positive effect of R&D inten-
sity of MNEs within a city in the Tobit model but insignificant effect in the Panel To-
bit model. The impacts of R&D intensity of MNEs within a province and R&D inten-
sity of MNEs within neighboring provinces are insignificant. The regression analysis 
of host country firms in Guangdong province shows that both R&D intensity of 
MNEs within a province and R&D intensity of MNEs within neighboring provinces 
have significantly negative effects on the R&D intensity of domestic firms. The mar-
ginal effect is calculated to document the magnitude of the impact 33 . The 
                                                 
32 High-capability domestic firms may also face the potential threat of foreign firms in 
lower-level group, but the empirical analysis shows that they choose to respond to the 
R&D effort of higher-level group MNEs because of the opportunity to learn from the 
more advanced foreign firms. Low-capability domestic firms, however, may find it 
difficult to learn from higher-level group MNEs, hence choose to respond to lower-
level group MNEs to maintain the technological gap between them and the lower-
level group MNEs. The impact of lower-group MNEs on the R&D intensity of low-
capability domestic firms also reveals one limitation of the economic model presented 
in Section 3.2: the model did not differentiate low-capability domestic firms from 
high-capability domestic firms. We will need to model the two groups of domestic 
firms separately to provide theoretical explanation to the reactions of high- and low-
capability domestic firms to foreign R&D effort.   
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results are presented in Table 3.13. Table 3.13 shows that in Guangdong province, an 
increase of .1 in the R&D intensity of MNEs within a province will lead to a decrease 
of .19 in the R&D intensity of a domestic firm, holding other explanatory variables 
constant. An increase of .1 in the R&D intensity of MNEs within neighboring prov-
inces will cause a decrease of .23 in the R&D intensity of a domestic firm, holding 
other explanatory variables constant.  
 To verify whether the negative impact of the R&D intensity of MNEs within a 
province and the R&D intensity of MNEs within neighboring provinces is not driven 
by location characteristics in Guangdong province 34, we collect data on the number of 
universities that have engineering and science majors for each city in Guangdong 
province and include this new variable in the analysis. The results are summarized in 
Table 3.14. The table shows that including number of universities in the analysis does 
not change the results. Furthermore number of universities does not have a significant 
impact on the R&D efforts of domestic firms in this sample, implying that university 
is not a major factor in Guangdong province for firms to choose location.  
 
3.4 Discussion and Policy Implications 
 
The empirical results based on technological distance between domestic firms and 
foreign firms imply that R&D intensity of host country firms in the IT industry in 
China generally increases with the R&D intensity of MNEs35. In particular, R&D in-
tensity of domestic firms is mainly influenced by MNEs with higher technological 
and management capabilities, implying relatively strong learning from MNEs with 
                                                 
34 For example, a firm that invests in R&D chooses to locate in a city because of the 
characteristics of the city that facilitates its R&D activities; a firm that does not invest 
in R&D chooses to not locate in this city because these characteristics are not of inter-
est to it.   
35 It could be driven by some common technological opportunity, but our control of 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































higher capabilities. The R&D intensity of a domestic firm with relatively low technologi-
cal and management capability is primarily affected by the R&D intensity of MNEs 
whose capabilities are lower than those of the domestic firm and not by the R&D inten-
sity of more advanced MNEs.  For domestic firms with relatively high technological and 
management skills, we find that their R&D effort is influenced by MNEs whose capabili-
ties are higher than those of the domestic firms and not by MNEs with lower technologi-
cal and management capabilities.  
 The results based on geographical distance demonstrate that the R&D effort of 
domestic firms in the IT industry in China is not affected MNEs located outside of a city. 
Furthermore, the analysis of domestic firms in Guangdong province shows that R&D in-
vestment by MNEs located outside of a city, but within the same province and neighbor-
ing provinces, has a negative impact. These findings consistently reveal a geographical 
boundary for a positive impact of the R&D offshoring of MNEs in the Chinese IT indus-
try.  
 Given the insights derived from the theoretical model and empirical evidence, we 
argue that through industry policy, governments in emerging economies could promote 
the productivity growth of domestic firms.36 In fact, industry policy that encourages co-
operation between domestic and foreign firms and facilitates learning within domestic 
firms through R&D or innovation subsidy is already in place in emerging economies.  
Such sound policy could ensure success, as argued by Laderman et al. (2003). Their 
study suggested that a host country could unleash a sequence of investments by success-
                                                 
36 Defined by Pack and Saggi (2006), an industry policy is a selective governmental in-
tervention that promotes the economic growth of industry sectors in the way that would 
not occur in the absence of such intervention in the market equilibrium. 
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fully inducing FDI from one or two important firms. Our analyses shed new light on the 
relevance and implementation of industry policies conducive to technological learning in 
emerging economies.  
 First, governments in emerging economies should be cautious about encouraging 
MNE R&D offshoring since its positive impact on the R&D effort of a domestic firm 
would be only conditional. Second, our findings show that the limited technological and 
management capabilities of domestic firms would impede their benefit from spillover 
generated by the R&D investment of MNEs. If an industry in a developing economy is 
relatively developed, industry policies favorable to foreign R&D investment would pro-
vide domestic firms with opportunities to learn from the more advanced foreign competi-
tors. The knowledge gained from this process is essential if emerging economies are to 
achieve successful technological upgrading at a later stage. However, if an industry falls 
into the category of an “infant” industry, government in a developing economy has rea-
sons to be suspicious about the impact of the R&D investment of MNEs on the R&D ef-
fort of domestic firms.  Even so, the R&D investment of MNEs could still exert a positive 




MNE R&D offshoring to emerging economies has become a prominent phenomenon in 
recent years. In this paper, we investigate how the R&D offshoring of MNEs affects the 
R&D effort of host country firms.  To investigate this issue, we have developed a two-
stage non-cooperative game as a theoretical foundation and gathered empirical evidence 
from a large dataset of 12,309 manufacturing firms in the IT industry in China.   
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 In general, we have found that domestic firms in the Chinese IT industry have in-
creased R&D effort in response to the R&D offshoring decisions of MNEs.  This implies 
that the positive spillover effects exceeded the negative competition effects of the R&D 
offshoring of MNEs on the R&D effort of domestic firms. Nevertheless, the magnitude of 
the impact is determined by the relative distance between the MNEs and the domestic 
firms. The R&D effort of high-capability domestic firms is primarily influenced by the 
R&D intensity of MNEs with higher technological capability; the R&D effort of low-
capability domestic firms is mainly influenced by the R&D intensity of MNEs with lower 
technological capability. The positive impact of MNEs’ R&D investment on domestic 
firms diminishes as the geographical distance between them increases. 
 Our findings provide important policy implications to both the host and the home 
countries of R&D offshoring. Understanding the response of host country competitors is 
not only critical if the MNEs are to choose the right R&D offshoring strategies but also 
important if policy makers in the MNEs’ home countries are to successfully regulate the 
MNE R&D offshoring to emerging economies. For host country policy makers, our find-
ings provide important implications regarding how emerging economies could leverage 
their FDI policy to facilitate technology spillover from MNEs and technology learning in 
domestic firms. The success of technology spillover and technology learning in host 
countries will greatly contribute to the long-term development of the indigenous innova-
tion capabilities of domestic firms. 
 Our study is limited in scope because we investigate only intra-industry R&D 
spillovers, not R&D spillovers from MNEs in one industry to other industries in host 
country. As a result, our findings could underestimate the overall positive effect of 
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MNEs’ R&D offshoring on host country firms. In addition to including other industries, 
such as upstream and downstream industry sectors, in the analysis, this study could be 
extended to industries other than IT, which will allow us to examine the generalization of 
our findings and the R&D spillover patterns in sectors other than IT.   Furthermore, this 
research could examine whether the potential influence of MNEs’ R&D offshoring on the 













Despite all the critiques about open source software (OSS), OSS has made significant in-
roads in many areas of software development, from operating systems (Linux), pro-
gramming languages (Perl) and Web browsers (Mozilla Firefox) to Web servers 
(Apache), database management systems (MySQL), mail management systems (Send-
mail) and typesetting engines (Tex) (Economides and Katsamakas, 2006; Lerner and Ti-
role, 2002; Schmidt and Schnitzer, 2003; Bitzer and Schroder, 2006; Gaudeul, 2007; Sen, 
2007; Lerner and Tirole, 2005). The growing market share and volume of installed base 
of some OSS force major proprietary software vendors (PRVs) to seriously consider the 
competitive position of OSS in the industry and employ a variety of strategies to counter 
the challenges of successful open source (OS) movement. For instance, Oracle stated in 
its analysis of key competition in 2007 that “The enterprise software industry is intensely 
competitive…open source alternatives such as MySQL AB in database, Red Hat, Inc. in 
middle ware, and SugarCRM Inc. in applications, are also impacting the competitive en-
vironment…in the sale of database software…our competitors include … the open source 
databases, MySQL and PostgresSQL…In the sale of middleware products…, our com-
petitors include… open source vendors such as Red Hat, Apache and Object-
Web. …Business intelligence competitors include…open source vendors Netezza Corpo-
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ration…”37 Sun Microsystems similarly stated in its annual report that “we are seeing in-
creased competition and pricing pressures from competitors offering systems running 
Linux software and other open source software.”38  BEA Systems acknowledged that 
“competitive pressures and open source availability of functionally competitive software 
could require us to reduce the price of our products and related services, which could 
harm our business.”39  
 Facing the challenge of OSS, commercial firms employ a number of strategies 
and build innovative business models to counter the challenges and to capitalize on OS 
movement (e.g., Lawton, 2007; Tam, 2004; Bank, 2003). For example, Red Hat uses a 
support business model where it commercially provides complementary services that are 
not supplied efficiently by the Linux community. Major PRVs such as Oracle, HP, 
Novell, IBM, SAP and Sun Microsystems are well-known advocates of OS movement 
(Vara, 2006; Tam, 2004; Stone, 2004; Kerstetter, 2004). For instance, Oracle started sell-
ing its own technical support for Red Hat's version of Linux in 2007; Sun Microsystems 
is also determined to offer free downloads of its Solaris software; In 2004, IBM submit-
ted a lightweight database called Cloudscape to the OS community - Apache Software 
Foundation, an organization that manages the widely used Apache Web server.  
 Academic researchers have also made significant contribution examining the is-
sues for competitive strategy in the landscape of OS movement (e. g., Bessen, 2006; 
Bitzer, 2004; Lerner and Tirole, 2002; Lerner and Tirole, 2005; Dahlander and Magnus-
son, 2006; Haruvy, Sethi and Zhou, 2005; Schmidt and Schnitzer, 2003; Economides and 
                                                 
37 Source: Oracle annual report 2007. 
38 Source: Sun Microsystems annual report 2007. 
39 Source: BEA Systems annual report 2007. 
 
 90 
Katsamakas, 2006a; Rossi and Bonaccorsi, 2006). Despite the growing body of literature 
investigating the strategic issues between PRVs and their OS counterparts, most of the 
prior pieces focus on software market where vendors’ revenue mainly comes from soft-
ware license. Nevertheless, OSS is also prominent in software markets where there is 
significant demand for maintenance and support service after the sale of software license. 
That is, both software license and post-sale service contract represent considerable por-
tion of some PRVs’ revenue. This is shown in Table 4.1.  
 Table 4.1 is a snapshot of influential OSS. It shows that OSS is not only promi-
nent and known in software markets where users do not require much support and service 
(e.g., Web browser and typesetting), but also in software markets where a significant por-
tion of PRVs’ revenue comes from maintenance and support of software (e.g., infrastruc-
ture software40 and database management systems41). For instance, as one of the world’s 
largest database software providers, 33% of Oracle’s total revenue in 2007 came from 
software license, and 46% from software maintenance and product support; maintenance 
and support also represented the highest margin business unit for Oracle42. Sun Microsys-
tems, a major provider of infrastructure product, earned 28.56% of its total revenue in 
2007 from support services consisting primarily of maintenance contract43. BEA Systems, 
Inc., a world leader in enterprise application and service infrastructure software, earned 
40.9% of its revenue from license fees and 59.1% from maintenance and 
                                                 
40 For example, Apache dominates the web server market; Sendmail and Postfix are popu-
lar OSS in E-mail server market; Linux is well known in operating systems market. 
41 MySQL, PostgresSQL and Firebird are popular OS databases. 
42 Source: Oracle annual report 2007. 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































support of its infrastructure software44. Generally, customers who purchase enterprise 
software licenses may also enter into maintenance contracts covering technical support 
services, regular software maintenance, and software updates and enhancements. These 
maintenance contracts generate persistent revenue for enterprise PRVs after the transac-
tion of software license (e.g., Banker and Slaughter, 1997; Tan and Mookerjee, 2005).  
 This paper is motivated by the significant difference between the two families of 
software, both of which witness notably dynamic and influential OS movement in recent 
years.  Software like database management systems (DBMS) in general requires much 
more maintenance service and support than software for typesetting, Web browsing or 
gaming purpose. The amount of support and service needed is determined in general by 
the complexity and scope of the software and whether the software is mission-critical45.  
For example, database types of software normally have higher complexity, are of larger 
scope and are more business-critical than software such as Web browser and computer 
games. As a result the former naturally require much more maintenance and support than 
the latter do. Furthermore, as support for software is complementary to software charac-
terized by large demand for support service, the software itself and the support associated 
with it intervene with each other. Hence, it is important to examine them in an integrated 
framework; while for software with low demand for support service, examining the soft-
ware alone would be sufficient.  
 The fundamental difference between the two families of software demands sepa-
rate treatments in investigating commercial software firms’ OS strategy. For example, do 
                                                 
44 Source: BEA Systems annual report 2007. 
45 Poor design in software may also lead to high demand for support. In this paper, I focus 




PRVs employ different OS strategies for software with low demand for service versus for 
software with high demand for service? How does the impact of OSS differ on the market 
structure for the two types of software market? The purpose of this Chapter is threefold. 
First, I investigate how activities in OS community enhance or replace the economic ac-
tivities of PRVs. In particular, how does the rise of OSS have an effect on PRV’s soft-
ware design strategy in terms of number of features and functions bundled in the software? 
Second, I investigate the impact of OSS on software market structure and on pricing 
strategy of PRV. Third, I examine how the impacts of OSS differ between software mar-
ket characterized by high demand for service and by low demand for service. 
 
4.2 Literature Review 
 
This paper is related with two streams of research: commercial software firms’ OS strate-
gies, and the impact of OS movement on PRS design. There is much discussion among 
industry experts about commercial software firms’ OS strategies (e.g., Lawton, 2007; 
Tam, 2004; Bank, 2003). The key question among these is: “How do firms seeking to sell 
products compete with free?” (von Krogh and von Hippel, 2006) Academic researchers 
summarize these strategies into four categories:  a) market segmentation strategy (i.e., 
PRVs cover a market segment different from the one covered by OSS) (Bessen, 2006; 
Bitzer, 2004); b) complementary product/service strategy (Lerner and Tirole, 2002; 
Lerner and Tirole, 2005; Dahlander and Magnusson, 2006; Haruvy, Sethi and Zhou, 2005; 
Schmidt and Schnitzer, 2003; Economides and Katsamakas, 2006b); c) subsidy/support 
strategy (i.e., PRVs participate in or subsidize OS projects) (Bessen, 2006; Rossi and Bo-
naccorsi, 2006; Dahlander and Magnusson, 2006; Lerner and Tirole, 2002; Lerner and 
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Tirole, 2005; Haruvy, Sethi and Zhou, 2005); d) releasing proprietary codes strategy 
(Lerner and Tirole, 2005).  
 Gaudeul (2005) investigates the direct competition between one OS and one pro-
prietary project in a duopoly model where both the cost and benefit of OSS are compared 
with PRS. The cost of adopting OSS includes lack of coordination in development and 
lack of interface. The cost of adopting PRS is that developers may choose to develop a 
limited number of features. The author found that OSS and PRS can coexist in equilib-
rium, but OSS is used by low-income customers or by developers. This proves the valid-
ity and stability of the market segmentation strategy. Bitzer (2004) similarly showed that 
decreasing heterogeneity between OSS and PRS can drive the price of PRS below its av-
erage cost, leading to PRV’s loss of incentive to develop PRS and forcing PRV to exit the 
market.   
  The complementary product/service strategy has been brought up in a number of 
studies. Economides and Katsamakas (2006a) developed a framework to investigate a 
platform firm’s pricing strategy for the platform and for complementary applications to 
the platform (two-sided pricing strategy of a platform firm) and how the pricing strategy 
influence the industry structure of the proprietary system as well as the OS system. They 
found that the overall profit of a proprietary system is larger than an OS system when us-
ers have a strong preference for application variety; however the variety of applications 
in the OS system is larger than in the proprietary system. The authors also examined the 
competition between OS platform and proprietary platform. They found that a vertically 
integrated proprietary system (proprietary platform and applications to the platform are 
provided by one firm) has a larger market share than an OS system if there is a relatively 
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large demand for the proprietary application, a large transition cost for the OS platform 
and a relatively small demand for application of the OS platform.  
 Although the payback of market segmentation strategy and complementary prod-
uct/service strategy to commercial software firms is straightforward, researchers found 
that the gain of releasing codes to OS community is not guaranteed. Haruvy, Sethi and 
Zhou (2005) examined conditions when a software firm should open its source codes ver-
sus close its source codes. They compared the revenue of a software provider under two 
scenarios: the software is developed in an OS way, where the provider’s revenue comes 
from complementary product of the OSS; the software is developed in a closed source 
way, where revenue comes from both software license and service. The authors demon-
strated that when there are more productive in-house programmers and when the initial 
quality of the software is high, opening source codes may not be beneficial to a firm. On 
the other hand, opening source codes becomes a viable alternative to closed source only 
when the involvement of OS community in the project reaches a critical level. Moreover, 
OS is preferred when programmer wage exceeds some threshold, even with highly pro-
ductive in-house programmers. Lerner and Tirole (2002) argued that PRVs release their 
proprietary codes to OS community in the hope that they can gain more by providing re-
lated services. However, releasing codes could be risky for PRVs if the payoff in the 
complementary service segment after the release does not exceed the payoff if the codes 
had not been converted to OS, which explains why the strategy of releasing codes to OS 




 Researchers also found that firms may have different incentives subsidizing or 
supporting OS projects. Some firms invest in OS development if the OSS is complement 
to the commercial software or hardware they produce (Schmidt and Schnitzer, 2003). 
Bessen (2006) investigated why firms contribute to OSS development when there is PRS 
from non-rival firms. The author argued that complexity of software limits the number of 
features included in PRS. Under-provision of features created a market for OS commu-
nity, which tends to develop more complex and geekier applications. Firms participate in 
OSS development for their own needs of software features. The author concludes that 
OSS extends software market rather than replace PRS. That is why OSS can grow in the 
presence of a competing PRV, and PRS can coexist with OSS because they cover differ-
ent market segments. Mustonen (2005) investigated when a PRV may support the devel-
opment of substitute OSS. The author showed that this could happen when the support 
creates compatibility between the programs and that the programs exhibit network effects. 
So supporting a rival OSS may allow the PRS and the OSS to share the same network. 
The resulting strong network effect of the PRS, however, is earned at the price of the 
PRV losing its network of old PRS, and at the cost of providing support to the OSS. 
Lerner and Tirole (2002) argued that PRV may want to subsidize the OS movement for 
strategic reasons such as weaken a rival or lessen the dependence on other vendors. 
 Another line of research on OS strategy is related to OS license. Kim, Chen and 
Mukhopadhyay (2006) examined and compared three software pricing mechanisms: pric-
ing of commercial software, pricing of OS product/service in OS dual license model, and 
pricing of open source product/service in OS support model. They investigated whether 
OS models are viable in monopoly and duopoly setting. They found that OS support 
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model is viable in the presence of quality asymmetry among competitors no matter 
whether the quality of OSS is higher or lower than commercial software.   
 The second stream of research related to this paper concerns the impact of OS 
movement on PRS design, in particular, on the design of software features. Bitzer and 
Schroder (2007) stated that “the question of what impact this unusual development 
method (OS) has on innovation activity in the software sector has received surprisingly 
little attention thus far.” They built a simple economic model and examined the impact of 
increased competition on innovation activity of both incumbents and entrants. They 
found that although incumbent commercial firms claim that technological progress will 
slow or even stop as a consequence of OSS entry, the model shows that it promotes inno-
vation, that is, enterprises choose to increase the technological levels after the emergence 
of OSS. Bitzer and Schroder (2006) argued that the emergence of OSS has raised fears of 
a potential anti-innovation effect on two main issues. First, “the emergence of a no-cost 
competitor on the software market raised the question of whether commercial enterprise 
will be able to compete successfully…decreasing profits of commercial software produc-
ers will lower their ability to invest in R&D activity, thus resulting in slower technologi-
cal progress in the software industry”; Second, “an anti-innovative effect of OSS may 
result if its development process is less efficient than that of commercially organized 
software.” To examine the legitimacy of OSS’s anti-innovation effect, the authors used 
the release history of Windows and Linux, Internet Explorer, Netscape’s Web browser 
and Mozilla Firefox, as a potential indicator of technological progress in software indus-
try. They found that “the data and cases presented do not offer evidence of an anti-
innovative impact; on the contrary, if anything, the entry of OSS into commercial seg-
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ments of the market appears to be associated with increased innovation activity.” 
Economides and Katsamakas (2006b) extended the model developed by Economides and 
Katsamakas (2006a) and analyzed the innovation incentive in systems of two platforms: 
the OS and the proprietary platform. Comparing vis-a-vis the innovation investment of 
OS system and PR system, they found that the investment in application is stronger when 
the platform is OS. This is because the OS platform is available for free, enabling the ap-
plication provider to set a larger price and capture a larger profit than the application pro-
vider for the proprietary platform. The authors also found that the level of investment in 
the application affects the level of investment in platform due to the complementarities 
between the application and the platform. In particular, the marginal benefit of investing 
in the platform decreases with the level of investment in the application. 
  Overall, most of the prior research investigate one type of software in the land-
scape of OS movement and do not systematically compare software that is different in 
nature. One exception is the research by Sen (2007). Sen (2007) compared the impact of 
OSS on PRV’s software usability and pricing decisions for two types of software: soft-
ware with strong network effect versus software with weak network effect. The author 
found that the two types of software markets reveal very different behavior given the en-
try of OSS. In software markets with low network effect, PRV is better off in the pres-
ence of competition from OSS while PRV in markets with high network effect is threat-
ened by the presence of OSS. Furthermore, PRV has little incentive to improve the us-
ability of their software in markets with low network effect, while the same strategy may 
drive PRV to exit the market in software market characterized by strong network effect. 
Lee and Mendelson (2008) similarly investigated the competition between a PRV and 
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OSS developers in software market characterized by network effect. They found that if 
the PRV enters the market first, it can capitalize the first-mover advantage by improving 
its product features.    
 
4.3 A Model 
 
4.3.1 A Case of MySQL 
 
I draw on the case of MySQL to promote the model to be presented in the next Section. 
MySQL is a popular OS DBMS. The company was acquired by Sun Microsystems in 
February 2008. It was founded in 1995 and is headquartered in Sweden today.  It has sev-
eral offices throughout the world with thousands of community members worldwide. 
MySQL is in the list of OSS building blocks called LAMP, representing Linux, Apache, 
MySQL and Perl (Wittig and Inkinen, 2004). It is used by Google, Yahoo!, Nokia, You-
Tube, Amazon and Travelocity among others. MySQL has received much attention of 
both media (e.g., Lawton, 2007; Tam, 2004; Bank, 2003; Lacy, 2006) and academic re-
searchers (e.g., Mustonen, 2005; Dahlander and Magnusson, 2006; Lerner and Tirole, 
2005; Kim, Chen and Mukhopadhyay, 2006). Mustonen (2005), Wittig and Inkinen 
(2004), Wittig (2006), and Dahlander and Magnusson (2006) prepared MySQL cases and 
documented the history, current market position and business model of MySQL.  
 MySQL is known not only because of its high growth rate and large volume of 
installed base, but also because it challenges a high-margin database software category 
and could reshape the database market as Linux has reshaped the server operating sys-
tems market. In their case study of MySQL, Dahlander and Magnusson (2006) mentioned 
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that the most prominent PRSs that are competitors of MySQL are the databases of Oracle 
and IBM. Industry analysts reported that “facing competition from open-source alterna-
tives”, not only Oracle, but also “IBM and Microsoft have each lowered their database 
prices and created low-end bundles aimed at smaller organizations and partners.” (La-
Monica, 2005)  
 MySQL used to use a so-called dual license model: the software is available un-
der both OS license GPL and proprietary license. In 2005 MySQL introduced the 
MySQL Network described as “a subscription service that provides updates, alerts, noti-
fications, knowledge base and production level support, that make it possible for compa-
nies to easily manage hundreds or thousands of MySQL servers. The core MySQL data-
base remains open source, but these services are only available to paying customers.” 
MySQL’s EVP of sales commented “we are following the Red Hat pattern. The subscrip-
tion business is growth business for us and that will overtake our OEM business” (Wittig, 
2006).  
 MySQL has been improving its product. In October 2005, MySQL released ver-
sion 5.0 which incorporated comparable features, such as stored procedures and triggers, 
to those of Oracle, IBM and Microsoft. These features were explicitly outlined by Oracle 
in 2004 to show the inferiority of MySQL (Wittig, 2006). With more advanced features 
released, MySQL is put in more direct competition with Oracle, IBM and Microsoft.  
 
4.3.2 Model Setup 
  
 I model the competition between a PRV and an OSS in a software market characterized 
by high demand for support and service. The PRV sells software license and support ser-
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vice for its proprietary software; the OSS is available for users free of charge; an OS ser-
vice provider adopts a support model and sells support service for the OSS. In the data-
base market, Oracle is the PRV, MySQL database is the OSS, and MySQL is the service 
provider for the OS database software. I build the model on the literature of vertical dif-
ferentiation. Following industry practice, I model the decision making process of the 
players as a three-stage noncooperative game (with no collusion).  
 
Stage 1: Software Design.  
 
In software market characterized by high demand for service, an OSS with Q features is 
provided free of charge46. A PRV chooses number of features/functions q for its software 
after observing Q. Let ],0[, qQq ∈  where q  represents the maximum number of fea-
tures/functions that can be developed for a PRV to earn a nonnegative profit. The devel-
opment cost is C(q)47 where C’(q) > 0, and C’’(q) > 0.   
 Number of features/functions bundled in the software is treated as the PRV’s de-
cision variable in the first stage because of the following reasons. First, the model is in-
tended to build an integrated framework including both software and subsequent support 
service for the software. The software engineering literature reports that the amount of 
maintenance service required for one software is closely related with the complexity in 
                                                 
46 Q is an exogenous variable in this model because the major incentive of OS developers 
is not to compete with PRV but for self recognition in OS community. Therefore OS de-
veloper is not modeled as a player in the game.  
47 C(q) includes  the cost to design and develop q features and to ensure the quality of the 
software if PRV is an entrant. If PRV is an incumbent, q represents the overall number of 
features bundled in the software; C(q) includes the cost to design and develop the incre-
mental features, the cost to ensure the quality of the software, including compatibility of 
new features to the system, maintainability, extensibility, robustness, reliability of the 
software, after including the incremental features.  
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software design; more complex software requires more maintenance and support effort48 
(e.g., Banker, Davis and Slaughter, 1998; Abreu and Melo, 1996; Briand, Morasca and 
Basili, 1999; Li, et al. 1995). It has been shown that function point49 in software is related 
with complexity or size of software, hence is related with maintenance effort for the 
software (Banker, Davis and Slaughter 1998; Swanson and Beath, 1989)50. Second, func-
tionality is one of the main evaluation criteria for DBMS51 (Wittig and Inkinen, 2004), 
which further gives good reason for using the number of functions/features as PRV’s de-
cision variable in the software design stage.  
 
Stage 2: Software Pricing.  
 
PRV chooses price p for the PRS developed in stage 1. Each consumer acquires one and 
only one copy of the software from either the OS community or the PRV (software mar-
ket is fully covered). D denotes the demand for PRS. Following Cohen and Whang 
(1997), D is determined by Q, q, p and the expected value of PRS service and OSS ser-
vice (denoted by A and B respectively). The rest of the market adopts OSS. Demand for 
OSS is denoted as Do.  
                                                 
48 Poor software design may also incur high demand for support service. However, this 
may not be of major concern in the case of MySQL database and Oracle database. 
MySQL uses a systematic approach to manage the process of software design and devel-
opment. Its database has an easy-to-use interface (Wittig and Inkinen, 2004). In general, 
OSS has to reach mature stage to be able to compete with an existing PRS. Literature has 
shown that OSS that reached mature stage is quite comparable with corresponding PRS 
in terms of quality in software design (Wheeler, 2005).  
49 A function point is a unit of measurement to express the amount of business functional-
ity an information system provides to a user.  
50 The literature of software engineering uses a variety of metrics to measure software 
complexity.  These are out of the scope of this paper and are not discussed here. A good 
discussion of these metrics can be found in Banker, Davis and Slaughter (1998). 




Stage 3: Service Pricing
52.  
 
As discussed in previous Section, software post-sale service provides additional value to 
software users. In this stage, PRV chooses service price ps for the PRS and a service pro-
vider specializing in OSS determines the service price ps
o for OSS. I normalize service 
cost per customer to zero, so that service price is the profit margin. PRS users purchase 
service from PRV and OSS users purchase service from OSS service provider53 if their 
net surplus of purchasing the service is positive. For the same type of buyers (defined in 
the next paragraph), I assume service is of higher value to buyers if the software pur-
chased in stage 2 is more complex, that is, the software is bundled with more fea-
tures/functions. This is reasonable because if software is simple and easy to use, users do 
not have much need for technical support; while if software is complicated or users lack 
experience in using it, technical support becomes much more important to keep the soft-
ware running and to update the software to topnotch condition. Following this logic, I 
denote the gross value of service for PRS and OSS by V(q) and V(Q) correspondingly 
where V’(.) > 0.  
Consumer Preference.  
 
                                                 
52 Some PRVs offer a bundle of software license and support contract. Oracle offers sepa-
rate prices for license and support. I follow the practice of Oracle and separate the pricing 
decision for license and support into two stages. The result remains the same if I combine 
stage 2 with stage 3. The result will change if the price for a bundle with both license and 
support is different from the sum of the prices if the two are sold separately. Since bun-
dling is not the focus of this paper, I separate the pricing for license and support for sim-
plicity.  
53 This is consistent with common industry practice. 
 
 104 
Consumers are uniformly distributed in a unit square where the two axes represent their 
taste for software features and service respectively54. For example, consumers located at 
(1, 1) have the highest valuation for software features and service; consumers located at 
(1, 0) have the highest valuation for software features but lowest valuation for service. 
Consumers know their type about software design at the beginning of stage 2, but get to 
know their type about service only after they consume the software, i.e., at the end of 
stage 2. This is because consumers’ type for service is closely related with consumers’ 
experience with the software. If the software runs smoothly, they may find less value of 
the service. If they have difficulty with the software, they may have greater need for the 
service. As a result, when consumers select software in stage 2, they use the expected 
surplus they anticipate to derive from the service as part of the input.  
 
4.4 The Equilibrium  
 
I start with the last stage to solve the model.  
Stage 3. Consumers’ utility is θ’V(q)- ps  if they purchase PRS service and θ’V(Q)- ps
o if 
they purchase OSS service. θ’ represents consumers’ type about service and is uniformly 


















PRS service and OSS service correspondingly. PRV’s problem at this stage is to maxi-
                                                 
54 This approach is commonly used in modeling consumer preferences in two dimensions. 
Consumers’ tastes for software features and service are assumed to be independent from 
each other because their relationship could be dependent on consumers’ specific require-
ments for the software, their technical capabilities and prior experience with similar 
products. Therefore, the relationship between them could be ambiguous. Customers with 
high valuation for software features may have low or high valuation for service; the same 
applies to customers with low valuation for software features. 
 
 105 






























for PRS and OSS correspondingly.  
Clearly, service providers for PRS and OSS are monopoly in their individual ser-
vice market; hence each of them covers half of the service market and prices service at 
half of the service value to obtain monopolistic service profit.  
Stage 2. Incorporating the above results into stage 2, I derive consumers’ expected net 

























Consumers’ expected utility of choosing PRS is θq-p+A. θ represents consumers’ 
type about software features and is uniformly distributed over the interval [0, 1]. θq-p 
represents utility from consuming the software and A represents expected utility of adopt-
ing PRS service. Consumers’ expected utility of adopting OSS is θQ+B. Let q>Q55, de-
mand is  
                                                 
55 PRVs have initial market power in majority of software markets (e.g., Windows and 
Linux; Oracle DBMS and MySQL DBMS), hence their PRS has higher market share and 
more software features than OSS initially. Following this market situation, I assume Q < 
q. Besides, this assumption is consistent with the situation in the DBMS market. MySQL 
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Proposition 2 shows that given the setup of this model, PRV gains larger market share 
than OSS in software market characterized by high demand for service as long as both 
the PRS and the OSS stay in the competition.  












                                                                                                                                                 
Oracle database (Wittig and Inkinen, 2004). If q ≤ Q, PRV will have zero demand. The 
condition will be checked later.  
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where p* and D*  are determined as in proposition 2. To make the problem tractable, fol-
lowing Thatcher and Pingry (2004), I assume C(q) = aq2 and let V(q )= bq and V(Q )= 
bQ,  where a > 0, and b ≥ 0.  
Proposition 3. If  ),( 21 bbb∈ where b1 and b2 are the roots of a quadratic function (8+3b)
2
-
64abQ-512aQ = 0, PRV’s payoff function is quasi-concave. The equilibrium number of 
















































The sufficient condition for q* > Q is Q < 1/(8a). Substituting q* into the expressions of 
p
* and D* specified in proposition 2 and into the expressions of ps
* and ps
o* specified in 
proposition 1, I derive the equilibrium PRS price and market share, and service prices for 
PRS and OSS.  
 
4.5 Findings and Managerial Implications 
 
Comparative analysis of the equilibrium is presented in a two-by-two framework in Table 
4.2. Table 4.2 reports how the impact of OSS differs on software market characterized 
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Table 4.2 Comparative Analysis 
 Q = 0 (No OSS) Q > 0 (With OSS) 
b = 0, software market with 





































b > 0, software market with 














































by low demand for service versus on software market characterized by high demand for 
service. The findings are summarized in the following propositions. 
Proposition 4. In software market characterized by low demand for service, when Q < 
1/8a, 
a. OSS does not have an effect on the optimal number of features developed in compet-
ing PRS. The optimal level of features in PRS remains at the threshold value 1/8a; 
b. PRS is priced lower after the entry of competing OSS;  
c. PRS remains the same market share after the entry of competing OSS.  
 The results reported in Proposition 4 are consistent with findings in prior literature 
that examines software market with low demand for service. For example, Bitzer and 
Schroder (2007) built a simple economic model to examine the impact of increased com-
petition due to OSS entry on innovation activity of both incumbents and entrants. They 
found that entry of OSS promotes innovation, that is, enterprises choose to increase the 
technological levels after the emergence of OSS. Bitzer and Schroder (2006) empirically 
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found support for the proposition in Bitzer and Schroder (2007). Note that although part 
(a) in Proposition 4 does not show an increase in PRV’s investment in software feature 
after the entry of OSS, it does not conflict with the findings in prior research. This is be-
cause the investment decision in my model (Stage 1) refers to service-demand-improving 
investment in software feature. PRV may invest in other innovation activities in response 
to the entry of OSS, which may lead to an increase in its overall technological level. 
Proposition 5
56. In software market characterized by high demand for service, when Q is 


















upper bound is the equilibrium number of features in PRS when there is no OSS; 
PRV lowers the equilibrium number of features as OSS includes more features. When 
Q exceeds the threshold q  but is less than 1/8a, the equilibrium number of features in 
PRS is at the highest level q . When Q exceeds 1/8a, PRV is driven out of the market.  
b. PRS is priced lower, but with larger market share when there is OSS than when there 
is no OSS. 
Part (a) of proposition 5 implies a magnetic phenomenon in the design of PRS with 
high demand for service that is not observed in the design of software with low demand 
for service. That is, when the number of features in OSS is below a threshold value, the 
optimal number of features in PRS with high demand for service is higher than the num-
                                                 
56 Proof of proposition 5 is based on the right continuity property of PRV’s payoff func-
tion at Q=0 and by taking derivative of first and second order condition of the payoff 




ber of features in the competing OSS; the higher the number of features in the OSS, the 
lower the number of features in the PRS. This situation resembles one in which the posi-
tion of RV is attracted to that of OSS. If the position of OSS exceeds the threshold, the 
design of PRS is placed at the maximal distance away from the position of OSS as if the 
two repelled one another, that is, q = q*.  
 This phenomenon can be explained by the leverage of market share effect and 
strategic effect discussed in the literature of product differentiation (Tirole, 1988). Ac-
cording to Tirole (1988), strategic effect and market share effect represent competing 
firms’ product choice.  The strategic effect dominates the market share effect when firms 
target their products at a maximal difference to avert intense competition; the market 
share effect dominates the strategic effect when firms target their products more closely 
to obtain a larger market share. It has been shown that in general, the strategic effect 
dominates the market share effect; hence firms tend to adopt the strategy of maximal dif-
ference. My findings suggest that in software market characterized by high demand for 
service, PRV’s software design strategy depends on the features in competing OSS: there 
is a threshold in the number of features in OSS, below which the market share effect 
dominates, and above which the strategic effect dominates. However, in software markets 
with low demand for service, the strategic effect always dominates the market share ef-
fect.  
 The intuition of PRV’s choice between market share effect and strategic effect is 
straightforward.  PRVs have three options when determining number of features in re-
sponse to OS entrant: decrease, increase or remain number of features in the software. 
For PRS with high demand for service, when the number of features in OSS is below a 
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threshold, decreasing number of features in the PRS will decrease software price and cus-
tomers’ valuation for service, but the loss of margin is compensated by larger demand for 
software as well as for service. So the market share effect dominates the strategic effect 
and PRV’s optimal response is to lower number of features. When OSS is positioned 
closer to PRS, the loss of margin in software and service exceeds the benefit of market 
share effect. It is optimal for PRV to play the high-end game, that is, only focus on cus-
tomers that value large number of features. Hence the strategic effect dominates the mar-
ket share effect. However, this strategy does not work for PRS with low demand for ser-
vice. For this software category, the benefit of market share effect is not strong enough to 
cover the loss of margin in software license because the margin in service is zero. As a 
result, PRV’s optimal response is to remain the same number of features.  
 An important implication of Proposition 5 is that in software markets character-
ized by high demand for service, when OSS is not very sophisticated PRV could intro-
duce more basic version of their software in response to the growth of OS counterparts. 
This implication is very much inline with industry practice. In the DBMS market, IBM, 
Oracle and Microsoft “have each lowered their database prices and created low-end bun-
dles aimed at smaller organizations and partners.” (LaMonica, 2005a) Oracle released a 
low-end, free but proprietary edition of its database in October 2005, supposedly as “a 
reaction to the growing competitive pressure from low-end open source databases.” (La-
Monica, 2005b) Andrew Mendelsohn, senior vice president of Oracle’s server technolo-
gies division, commented on this move: “There is definitely a market there (for low-end 
databases) and a demand. And we want them to be using Oracle and not MySQL or SQL 
Server Express.” (LaMonica, 2005b)  
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 The strategic handling of market share effect and strategic effect can also be used 
to explain PRVs OS strategies. Two common OS strategies employed by PRVs are:  sub-
sidize OS projects by having their employees working on these projects or making their 
PRS compatible with OSS (e.g., IBM, HP, SAP, Oracle, Siemens); and submit their pro-
prietary products to the OS community (e.g., IBM submitted its database Cloudscape to 
Apache; BEA, Computer Associates and Sun also donated their PRS to OS community). 
Researchers in general believe these strategies provide PRVs with the strategic advantage 
to hurt rivals or the opportunity to profit through complementary products or services. 
My finding shows that market share may be additional benefit that drives PRV’s behavior. 
Both releasing codes and making PRS compatible with OSS help PRVs gain larger mar-
ket share by attracting users of OS products. For example, by making its DBMS compati-
ble with Linux, Oracle effectively attracts Linux users to their products run on Linux.  
 The finding of PRV’s pricing strategy (part b in Proposition 5) is also consistent 
with industry practice. For example, BEA Systems reported in its annual report of 2007 
that “competitive pressures and open source availability of functionally competitive soft-
ware could require us to reduce the price of our products and related services.” Some ana-
lysts believe that MySQL gave Oracle’s corporate customers more price bargaining 
power than in the past despite the lack of functionality of MySQL compared with Oracle 
database (Wittig and Inkinen, 2004).        
 The results presented in Propositions 4 and 5 allow me to compare the impact of 
OSS on market structure of two categories of software markets: software with high ser-
vice demand and software with low service demand. The finding implies that OSS will be 
stronger in terms of market share in markets with low demand for service than in market 
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with high demand for service; PRV gains larger market share in software market charac-
terized by high service demand than in market with low service demand. These hold true 
so long as OSS is not very advanced. The results are consistent with Economides and 
Katsamakas (2006a).  They found that a vertically integrated proprietary system (proprie-
tary platform and applications to the platform are provided by one firm) has a larger mar-
ket share than OS system if there is a relatively large demand for the proprietary applica-
tion, a large transition cost for the open source platform and a relatively small demand for 
application of the open source platform.  
 The intuition is that in software markets with high demand for service, PRV has 
the advantage of manipulating software design and optimizing pricing for both software 
and service. OS service provider however does not have as much influence on the design 
of OSS as the influence PRV has on its own software. This disadvantage of OS support 
provider leads to smaller market share of OSS in markets with high demand for service 
than in markets with low demand for service. To certain extent this resembles the case of 
an integrated system (proprietary system including software and service) versus a disin-
tegrated system (OS system). Interestingly although MySQL CEO Marten Mickos be-
lieved that eventually Oracle, Microsoft, and IBM would realized that MySQL could be a 
threat to their database business, my model shows that if MySQL does not have full con-
trol on the development of MySQL database, and is not able to align its development ob-
jective with the objective of MySQL database OS developers, it will not dominate the 




57. PRS with high demand for service has more features and larger market 
coverage than PRS with low demand for service regardless of whether there is OSS.  
Proposition 6 is intuitive. In software market with high demand for service, PRV 
can derive higher margin selling service by increasing the number of features. The supe-
riority of this type of PRS in terms of features helps increase demand for corresponding 
service, which in turn improves the expected value consumers can derive from purchas-
ing the software. Naturally, market coverage for PRS with high demand for service is 
higher.  
Proposition 758.  
a. OSS hurts PRV’s payoff in both types of software markets. When OSS is sufficiently 
advanced, PRV is driven out of the market.   
b. PRV of software with high demand for service has higher payoff than PRV of soft-
ware with low demand for service regardless of whether there is OSS.  
Proposition 7 is very intuitive. Part (a) implies that competing with OSS in the same 
market is ultimately a bad strategy for PRV. In the long run, PRV has to find a way to 




                                                 
57 Proof of proposition 6 is straightforward, hence is omitted. 




OSS has become prominent in many categories of software. I investigate how the rise of 
OSS influence software market structure and PRV’s software design strategy. In particu-
lar, I examine how the impacts of OSS differ between software market characterized by 
high demand for service and by low demand for service. I found that when there is com-
petition between OSS and PRS, PRS is priced lower because of the entry of OSS. OSS 
have larger market share in markets with low demand for service than in markets with 
high demand for service. PRV’s software design strategy in response to OSS differs be-
tween software with high demand for service and software with low demand for service: 
PRV’s software design demonstrates a magnetic phenomenon for software with high de-
mand for service, the purpose of which is to increase software market share, which fur-
ther promotes more revenue in service; this magnetic phenomenon is not found in soft-





Interaction between R&D Intensity of MNEs and Host Country Firms 
 
Combining R&D expenditure and output certainly makes the analysis more complicated. 
It can be established that R&D activity of MNEs in host country lowers domestic R&D 






XfGILEmfIKbRfGIJfIKbRB Dα . Whether this con-
dition satisfies crucially depends on domestic spillover coefficient αF. αF represents the 
ease for innovating domestic firms to absorb the R&D spillover of MNEs. Figure A.1 
plots the change in domestic R&D intensity in response to R&D activity of MNEs in host 
country as a function of αF for various levels of MNE spillover coefficient γD. γD repre-
sents the ease for innovating MNEs to absorb the R&D spillover of domestic firms. If it 
is easy for innovating domestic firms to learn from MNEs, the R&D intensity of domestic 
firms increases with the R&D intensity of MNEs. If it is difficult for innovating domestic 






















List of Neighboring Provinces 
 
Table B.1: List of Neighboring Provinces 
Province Neighboring Provinces 
Beijing Tianjin, Hebei 
Tianjin Beijing, Hebei 
Hebei Beijing, Tianjin, Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Liaoning, Shandong, Henan 
Shanxi Hebei, Inner Mongolia, Henan, Shaanxi 
Inner Mongolia Hebei, Shanxi, Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Shaaxi, Gansu, Ningxia 
Liaoning Hebei, Inner Mongolia, Jilin 
Jilin Inner Mongolia, Liaoning, Heilongjiang 
Heilongjiang Inner Mongolia, Jilin 
Shanghai Jiangsu, Zhejiang 
Jiangsu Shanghai, Zhejiang, Anhui, Shandong 
Zhejiang Shanghai, Jiangsu, Anhui, Fujian, Jiangxi 
Anhui Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei 
Fujian Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Guangdong 
Jiangxi Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong 
Shandong Hebei, Jiangsu, Henan 
Henan Hebei, Shanxi, Anhui, Shandong, Hubei, Shaanxi 
Hubei Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hunan, Chongqing, Shaanxi 
Hunan Jiangxi, Hubei, Guangdong, Guangxi, Chongqing, Guizhou 
Guangdong Fujian, Jiangxi, Hunan, Guangxi, Hainan 
Guangxi Hunan, Guangdong, Hainan, Guizhou, Yunnan 
Hainan Guangdong, Guangxi 
Chongqing Hubei, Hunan, Sichuan, Guizhou, Shaanxi 
Sichuan Chongqing, Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai 
Guizhou Hunan, Guangxi, Chongqing, Sichuan, Yunnan 
Yunnan Guangxi, Sichuan, Guizhou, Tibet 
Gansu Inner Mongolia, Sichuan, Shaanxi, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang 
Qinghai Sichuan, Tibet, Gansu, Xinjiang 
Ningxia Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi, Gansu 
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